The New Climate World: Achieving Economic Efficiency in a Federal System for Greenhouse Gas Control through a State Planning Combined with Federal Programs by McKinstry, Robert B., Jr. et al.
NORTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
COMMERCIAL REGULATION
Volume 34 | Number 3 Article 3
Spring 2009
The New Climate World: Achieving Economic
Efficiency in a Federal System for Greenhouse Gas
Control through a State Planning Combined with
Federal Programs
Robert B. McKinstry Jr.
Thomas D. Peterson
Adam Rose
Dan Wei
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncilj
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Robert B. McKinstry Jr., Thomas D. Peterson, Adam Rose & Dan Wei, The New Climate World: Achieving Economic Efficiency in a
Federal System for Greenhouse Gas Control through a State Planning Combined with Federal Programs, 34 N.C. J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg.
767 (2008).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncilj/vol34/iss3/3
The New Climate World: Achieving Economic Efficiency in a Federal
System for Greenhouse Gas Control through a State Planning Combined
with Federal Programs
Cover Page Footnote
International Law; Commercial Law; Law
This article is available in North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/
ncilj/vol34/iss3/3
THE NEW CLIMATE WORLD: ACHIEVING
ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY IN A FEDERAL
SYSTEM FOR GREENHOUSE GAS CONTROL
THROUGH STATE PLANNING COMBINED
WITH FEDERAL PROGRAMS
Robert B. McKinstry, Jr., Thomas D. Peterson, Adam Rose and
Dan Wei
"The maximum range of anatomical possibilities arises with
the first rush of diversification. Later history is a tale of
restriction, as most of these early experiments succumb and life
settles down to generating endless variants upon a few surviving
models. "'
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I. Introduction
A strong federal response to global climate change by the
United States is now assured, with key elements in progress. In
response to the Supreme Court's mandate in Massachusetts v.
EPA,2 the new Administration's Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) will make a finding that emissions of greenhouse gases
(GHGs) cause or contribute to pollution that can reasonably be
anticipated to endanger health or welfare. This will trigger
requirements to regulate those emissions under many sections of
2 See Mass. v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (ruling that Congress had not denied the
EPA the authority to regulate greenhouse gases).
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the existing federal Clean Air Act,3 as outlined in the EPA's
Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Regulating
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act (ANPR).a
The new Administration is committed to use the existing law and
to seek new legislative authority to address the issue with a suite
of both traditional regulatory tools, other sector-based policy
instruments, and market-based mechanisms such as cap-and-
trade.5
There is no doubt that a strong federal response is necessary
and that this response must be effective in both the short and long
term. In order to stabilize global levels of GHGs at a range that
will limit global average increases in average temperature to 2' C
and thereby prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the
climate system as required by the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC),6  the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) estimates that
global GHG emissions will need to be reduced between fifty and
eighty percentfrom 2000 levels by the year 2050.' Because the
3 Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (2006).
4 Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: Regulating Greenhouse Gas
Emissions Under the Clean Air Act, 73 Fed. Reg. 44354 (proposed July 30, 2008) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. chpt. 1), available at http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2008/pdf/E8-
16432.pdf [hereinafter ANPR].
5 See Barackobama.com, Barack Obama and Joe Biden: New Energy for America
2-3, http://www.barackobama.com/pdf/factsheet-energyspeech 080308.pdf (last
visited Mar. 26, 2009). Specifically, the new administration plans to implement an
economy-wide cap-and-trade system to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 80% of their
1990 levels by 2050, as well as support the utilization of renewable energy in the private
sphere. Id.
6 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Apr. 30-May 9,
1992, art. 2, U.N. Doc. A/AC.237/18 (Part II)/Add. 1 (1992) available at
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/ac237/ac237-18pt2addl [hereinafter UNFCCC].
7 INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007:
SYNTHESIS REPORT, SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 20 (2007), available at
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr spm.pdf [hereinafter 4TH IPCC
SUMMARY FOR POL'YMAKERS]. James Hansen et al. have summarized the state of the
scientific knowledge regarding final goal setting as follows:
"The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and others used
several 'reasons for concern' to estimate that global warming of more
than 2-3°C may be dangerous. The European Union adopted 2'C above
preindustrial global temperature as a goal to limit human-made
warming." Further, they "argued for a limit of I°C global warming
(relative to 2000, 1.7°C relative to preindustrial time), aiming to avoid
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United States is responsible for almost 15% percent of world
emissions with only approximately 4.5% of the world's
population, significantly greater emissions reductions will be
required in the United States.8
The nature of GHGs also make long-term planning and long-
term goal setting a crucial part of any effective policy. Because
GHGs have a long residence time, their impacts are delayed,9 and
they are generated by infrastructure that has both a long lifetime
and requires long lead times for financing and construction,
planning and implementation of control measures must begin
many decades before significant problems manifest themselves,
practically irreversible ice sheet and species loss. This IC limit, with
nominal climate sensitivity of 3/4°C per W/m2 and plausible control of
other GHGs, implies maximum CO 2 - 450 ppm.
[The] current analysis suggests that humanity must aim for an even
lower level of GHGs. Paleoclimate data and ongoing global changes
indicate that 'slow' climate feedback processes not included in most
climate models, such as ice sheet disintegration, vegetation migration,
and GHG release from soils, tundra or ocean sediments, may begin to
come into play on time scales as short as centuries or less. Rapid on-
going climate changes and realization that Earth is out of energy
balance, implying that more warming is 'in the pipeline', add urgency
to investigation of the dangerous level of GHGs.
A probabilistic analysis concluded that the long-term CO2 limit is in the
range 300-500 ppm for 25 percent risk tolerance, depending on climate
sensitivity and non-CO 2 forcings. Stabilizing atmospheric CO2 and
climate requires that net CO 2 emissions approach zero, because of the
long lifetime of CO 2.
James Hansen et al., Target Atmospheric C0 2: Where Should Humanity Aim?, 2 OPEN
ATMOSPHERIC Sc. J. 217, 217-231 (2008), available at http://www.bentham-
open.org/pages/content.php?TOASCJ/2008/00000002/00000001/217TOASCJ.SGM
(follow "Download" hyperlink) (citations omitted). The authors argue for a lower target
level. Id.
8 The United States emitted 7.078 gigatons of GHGs in 2004 CO 2e, see ANPR,
supra note 4, at 44402 fig.III-I, or 14.4% of the world emissions of 49.0 gigatons, see 4T
IPCC SUMMARY FOR POL'YMAKERS, supra note 7, at 5. The U.S. population on January
4, 2009 was 305,548,018, see U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. POPCIock Projection,
http://www.census.gov/population/www/popclockus.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2009), as
compared to a world population on January 1, 2009 of 6,750,819,383, see U.S. Census
Bureau, World POPClock Projection, http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/
popclockworld.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2009); thus, the United States only comprises
4.5% of the world's population.
9 See Hansen et al., supra note 7, at 219.
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and must continue over decades.' Moreover, given the fact that
there is still scientific uncertainty regarding the sensitivity of .the
climate system to various levels of GHGs, there must be sufficient
flexibility built into the system to allow goals to be adjusted,
upwards or downwards, as new scientific evidence becomes
available." However, there must be sufficient certainty regarding
demand for low carbon fuels and electricity to provide certainty
regarding returns to capital markets.
We will argue that for this federal response to be effective in
either the short run or the long-term, it must include several
important elements. First, it must involve very long-term as well
as short-term goal setting with sufficient flexibility to allow
changes that reflect improvements in both science and technology.
Second, it must engage the existing state, local, and regional
programs to address climate change that have developed over the
last eight years while the federal government dawdled.
Incorporation of existing and planned state programs 2 is not only
desirable in that they can provide a jump start for federal
implementation, but necessary, since states exercise primary
authority over many areas that will be crucial for an effective
response and for removal of market barriers-areas such as land
use, building codes and standards, utility regulation, water supply,
transportation planning, municipal waste, agriculture and
forestry. 3 Third, an effective federal program must incorporate
sector-based climate policy planning at the state level to allow the
full range of tools to be brought to bear on the problem and
coordinated to produce the most cost effective approach to GHG
emissions reduction. The scale up of the results of twenty state-
level climate planning processes presented in this article 4 show
1o Id. at 228-29.
I1 See Hansen et al., supra note 7 passim; see also ANPR, supra note 4, at 44400-
08.
12 By referring to state programs in this article, we will intend to incorporate
references to regional and local programs, which are the creations of the states.
13 See EPA, Action Policy Glossary, http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/wycd/state
andlocalgov/state.html (follow "State Climate Plans Action Database" hyperlink; then
follow "Glossary of State Policy Recommendations" hyperlink) (setting out descriptions
of state policy recommendations for climate control in various state controlled sectors)
(last visited Mar. 26, 2009).
14 The twenty states and the sources of data are: Arkansas, ARKANSAS
GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON GLOBAL WARMING, FINAL REPORT (2008), available at
2009
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http://www.arclimatechange.us/ewebeditpro/items/094F20338.pdf; Arizona, ARIZONA
CLIMATE CHANGE ADVISORY GROUP, CLIMATE CHANGE ACTION PLAN (2006), available
at http://www.azclimatechange.gov/download/O40F9347.pdf, California, CALIFORNIA
AIR RESOURCES BOARD, CLIMATE CHANGE DRAFT SCOPING PLAN (2008), available at
http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/scopingplan/document/draftscopingplan.pdf; Colorado,
CLIMATE ACTION PANEL, FINAL REPORT (2007), available at http://www.coloradoclimate.
org/ewebeditpro/items/O14F13892.pdf; Connecticut, CONNECTICUT GOVERNOR'S
STEERING COMMITTEE ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 2005 CT CLIMATE CHANGE ACTION PLAN
(2005), available at http://www.ctclimatechange.com/StateActionPlan.html; Florida,
FLORIDA GOVERNOR'S ACTION TEAM ON ENERGY AND CLIMATE CHANGE, FLORIDA'S
ENERGY AND CLIMATE CHANGE ACTION PLAN (2008), available at http://www.flclimate
change.us/ewebeditpro/items/O 12F20128.PDF; Iowa, IOWA CLIMATE CHANGE
ADVISORY COUNCIL, FINAL ICCAC REPORT (2008), available at http://www.iaclimate
change.us/capag.cfm (last visited Mar. 25, 2009); Maine, MAINE DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, FINAL MAINE CLIMATE ACTION PLAN 2004 (2004),
available at http://www.maine.gov/dep/air/greenhouse/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2009);
Maryland, MARYLAND COMMISSION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE ACTION PLAN
(2008), available at http://www.mde.state.md.us/Air/climatechange/index.asp (last
visited Feb. 9, 2009); Michigan, MICHIGAN CLIMATE ACTION COUNCIL, CLIMATE ACTION
PLAN (2009), available at http://www.miclimatechange.us/stakeholder.cfin (last visited
Mar. 25, 2009); Minnesota, MINNESOTA CLIMATE CHANGE ADVISORY GROUP,
MINNESOTA CLIMATE CHANGE ADVISORY GROUP FINAL REPORT (2008), available at
http://www.mnclimatechange.us/MCCAG.cfm; Montana, MONTANA CLIMATE CHANGE
ADVISORY COMMITTEE, MONTANA CLIMATE CHANGE ACTION PLAN (2007), available at
http://www.mtclimatechange.us/CCAC.cftn (last visited Feb. 9, 2009); North Carolina,
NORTH CAROLINA CLIMATE ACTION PLAN ADVISORY GROUP, CAPAG FINAL REPORT
(2008), available at http://www.ncclimatechange.us/capag.cfm (last visited Mar. 25,
2009); New Mexico, NEW MEXICO CLIMATE CHANGE ADVISORY GROUP, NM CLIMATE
CHANGE ACTION PLAN (2006), available at http://www.nmclimatechange.us/ (last visited
Feb. 9, 2009); New York, CENTER FOR CLEAN AIR POLICY AND NEW YORK GHG TASK
FORCE, RECOMMENDATIONS TO GOVERNOR PATAKI FOR REDUCING NEW YORK STATE
GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS (2003), available at http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/
wycd/stateandlocalgov/states/ny.html (follow hyperlinks under "Climate Change Action
Plan") (last visited Feb. 9, 2009); Rhode Island, RHODE ISLAND GREENHOUSE GAS
PROCESS, RHODE ISLAND GREENHOUSE GAS ACTION PLAN (2002), available at
http://righg.raabassociates.org/ (last visited Feb. 9, 2009); South Carolina, SOUTH
CAROLINA CLIMATE, ENERGY AND COMMERCE COMMITTEE, SOUTH CAROLINA CECAC
FINAL REPORT (2008), available at http://www.scclimatechange.us/plenarygroup.cfm
(last visited Feb. 9, 2009); Utah, HOWARD GELLER, SARAH BALDWIN, PATTI CASE, KEVIN
EMERSON, THERESE LANGER, & SARAH WRIGHT, UTAH ENERGY EFFICIENCY STRATEGY:
POLICY OPTIONS (2007), available at http://www.swenergy.org/pubsfUTEnergy_
EfficiencyStrategy.pdf; Vermont, VERMONT GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON CLIMATE
CHANGE, FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON
CLIMATE CHANGE (2007), available at http://www.anr.state.vt.us/air/Planning/htm/ccv
tactions.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2009); and Washington, WASHINGTON CLIMATE
ADVISORY TEAM, LEADING THE WAY: A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO REDUCING
GREENHOUSE GASES IN WASHINGTON STATE (2008), available at http://www.ecy.wa.gov/
climatechange/2008CATdocs/ltwappv2.pdf.
THE NEW CLIMATE WORLD
that, if implemented by all fifty states, GHG emissions reduction
plans can achieve their goals cost-effectively.'5 Specifically, this
scale-up shows that state climate plans can achieve reductions of
GHG emissions to 10% below 1990 levels by the year 2020 at a
net economy-wide cost savings of $20.8 billion by 2012, net
savings of $85.065 billion by 2020, and net cumulative savings of
$535.5 billion for the period 2009 to 2020.16 These reductions, on
this timeline, will be consistent with long-term goals intended to
stabilize the climate at levels that will prevent dangerous
anthropogenic interference with the Earth's climate system. 7
Establishing and implementing the long-term goals necessary
for an effective response to climate change presents significant
challenges to our political systems, with two-, four- and six- year
term horizons,18 as well as free market capital systems which look
to quarterly returns, with three- and four-year time horizons
representing long-term returns. This suggests that dealing with
climate change requires legal and policy mechanisms that will
establish both long-term multi-decadal goals and short-term goals
for GHG emissions based on concentration goals that will send
sufficient messages to capital markets, maintain sufficient
flexibility to implement adaptive management and adjust the
concentration and emission goals as new scientific information
and technologies emerge, and tailor means to the real conditions in
which decisions are made regarding both capital investments and
individual lifestyles.
Legislative models with fixed legislative goals, such as those
presented by the Clean Air Act Acid Rain Program, 9 or the
15 See THE CTR. FOR CLIMATE STRATEGIES, ECONOMIC STIMULUS, RECOVERY, AND
CLIMATE MITIGATION: POLICY AND PROGRAM OPPORTUNITIES FROM THE STATES 2 (
2008), http://www.climatestrategies.us/ewebeditpro/items/O25F20666.PDF [hereinafter
CTR. FOR CLIMATE STRATEGIES, POL'Y & PROGRAM OPPORTUNITIES]. See also infra app.
11, p. 36 fig.2, p. 42 fig.5 and p. 43 fig.6.
16 CTR. FOR CLIMATE STRATEGIES, POL'Y & PROGRAM OPPORTUNITIES, supra note
15, at 3.
17 See UNFCCC, supra note 6, at art. 2.
18 See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl.1 (describing election of House of
Representatives); U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 3, cl. 1, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, §
1 (describing election of Senate); U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 1, cl.1 (describing election of
President and Vice President).
19 Clean Air Act §§ 401-416, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651-7651o (2006). Many have looked
to the acid rain program as a model for dealing with climate change. However,
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detailed requirements incorporated into federal environmental
laws in response to the Reagan Administration's attempts to roll
back the progress of the 1970s,2" do not provide the flexibility
needed to adjust goals and policies over the long term. For
example, while the Clean Air Act Acid Rain Cap-and-Trade
Program2 successfully achieved the reductions called for by the
legislation and partially solved the problem of acid rain, acid rain
has persisted.22 The specificity of the legislatively mandated
reduction goals has created barriers both to the actions of
individual states and to achieving the further reductions necessary
to address the continuing problem.23 Similarly, the New Deal
approach of telling the expert agency simply to solve the
problem24 will not give sufficient direction and certainty to guide a
multi-decadal federal effort or sufficiently involve the states.
The federal Clean Air Act represents a regulatory model
intermediate between these extremes, and also contains the
mechanisms and the flexibility to allow the type of long-term
adaptive management necessary to meet the challenges presented
significant differences in the nature of the problem make that model less useful. See
Thomas D. Peterson, Robert B. McKinstry, Jr., & John C. Dernbach, Developing a
Comprehensive Approach to Climate Change Policy in the United States: Integrating
Levels of Government and Economic Sectors, 26 VA. ENvTL. L. J. 227, 246-51 (2008)
[hereinafter Peterson et al., Developing a Comprehensive Approach].
20 See, e.g., Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984 (HSWA), Pub. L.
No. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3224 (Nov. 8, 1984) (re-authorizing the EPA's setting of standards
for facilities generating or maintaining hazardous waste as established in 1976); the
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), Pub. L. No. 99-499,
100 Stat. 1613, 1615 (Oct. 17, 1986) (regulating liability and providing funds for
disposal of municipal waste).
21 Clean Air Act §§ 401-416. See also EPA, CAP AND TRADE: ACID RAIN
PROGRAM BASICS, http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/cap-trade/docs/arbasics.pdf (2003).
22 See EPA, CAP AND TRADE: ACID RAIN PROGRAM RESULTS,
http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/cap-trade/docs/ctresults.pdf (2003). Although SO 2
emissions have been reduced by over seven million tons from their 1980 levels, total
emissions remain slightly above the cap established by the EPA. Id. at 1.
23 This problem is exemplified by the fact that the allowance system established by
the Clean Air Act acid rain program was cited in overturning the Clean Air Interstate
Rule's attempt to reduce emissions of acid rain precursors to address this continuing
problem. See N.C. v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896, 902-03 (D.C. Cir. 2008), modified on reh 'g,
550 F.3d 1176 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 23, 2008).
24 See Martin Shapiro, APA: Past, Present, Future, 72 VA. L. REv. 447, 449-50
(1986).
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by climate change. 25 In the ANPR, the EPA has outlined an
effective vision of how numerous GHG emissions reductions can
be achieved using the Clean Air Act;26 however, the agency's
analysis fails to address the critical issues of how the broad range
of state and regional programs already in existence can be
incorporated, broadened and rationalized into a federal system, or
the role of climate planning as a means of achieving this
coordination. As discussed in detail below, like many other
statutes seeking to address complex problems,27 the Clean Air Act
25 The authors of this article, as well as others, have previously argued that the
Clean Air Act includes tools that can readily be adapted to address climate change
effectively and incorporate state programs. See Robert B. McKinstry, Jr., John C.
Dernbach & Thomas D. Peterson, Federal Climate Change Legislation as if the States
Matter, 22 NAT. RESOURCES & ENv'r. 3 (2008) [hereinafter McKinstry, Jr. et al., Federal
Climate Change Legislation]; Peterson et al., Developing a Comprehensive Approach,
supra note 19; Holly Doremus & W. Michael Hanemann, Of Babies and Bathwater:
Why the Clean Air Act's Cooperative Federalism Framework is Useful for Addressing
Global Warming, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 799 (2008); Robert B. McKinstry, Jr. & Thomas D.
Peterson, The Implications of the New "Old" Federalism in Climate-Change
Legislation: How to Function in a Global Marketplace When States Take the Lead, 20
PAC. McGEORGE GLOBAL Bus. & DEV. L.J. 61 (2007) [hereinafter McKinstry, Jr. et al.,
The Implications of the New "Old" Federalism].
26 ANPR, supra note 4, at 44354.
27 For example, virtually all states employ comprehensive planning as a means to
address the complex problems presented by land use regulation. See Robert B.
McKinstry, Jr., James McElfish, Michael Jacobson & Coreen Ripp, Opportunities for
Regulation of Land Use and Development as a Legal Tool to Protect Biodiversity, in
BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION HANDBOOK 257, 266-67 (Robert B. McKinstry, Jr.,
Coreen Ripp & Emily Lisy eds., 2006); Linda Breggin & Susan George, Planning for
Biodiversity: Sources of Authority in State Land Use Laws, 22 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 81, 105-
07 (2003). Virtually every federal environmental statute, particularly those addressing
land use or complex processes, also require planning. See, e.g., National Forest
Management Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1604 (2006) (land and resource management plans);
Federal Land Policy and Management Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1712 (2006) (land use plans);
Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1533(0 (2006) (endangered species recovery
plans); Coastal Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1455b (2006) (calling for state
management plans/programs for protection of coastal waters); Marine Mammal
Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1383b(b) (2006) (calling for conservation plans for depleted
species); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 42
U.S.C. § 9605 (2006) (providing for the development of a National Contingency Plan to
manage remediation of hazardous sites); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 6941-6949a (2006) (calling for state solid waste management plans for non-
hazardous wastes); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1252 (2006) (comprehensive programs
for water pollution control); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1281 (requiring waste
treatment management plans as prerequisite to grants); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §
1288 (area-wide waste treatment plan); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1289 (basin
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contains a planning mechanism that could be used to achieve
incorporation. Planning mechanisms are necessary to coordinate a
wide variety of biological, economic, and social concerns and
multiple legal tools. The planning process enables the policy
maker to take a big picture view by identifying goals, constraints,
and conflicts, and by creating a structure that selects means that
will take account of these considerations.28 Section 110 of the
Clean Air Act29 calls for the development of State Implementation
Plans (SIPs) to achieve and maintain national ambient air quality
standards (NAAQS). Although the SIP mechanism for other
"criteria pollutants" has previously been used in a formulaic
manner, it can be readily adapted to incorporate existing
progressive state and regional climate plans and programs, if
modified to give all states specific numeric GHG emissions
reduction targets to be met through their SIPs. Sections 108, 109
and 110 of the Clean Air Act provide the EPA with broad
authority to create a cap-and-trade program and other regulatory
and management programs that rely first on the states to create a
mix of state management, financing, and regulatory programs
most appropriate for each state's economy, climate, resources, and
legal structure.3" Use of the SIP or a similar type of model to
provide for state level planning will be critical for the success of a
comprehensive and cost effective GHG emissions reduction
program.
In its comments on the EPA staff draft of ANPR, the
Department of Transportation refers to this general language in the
Clean Air Act as a "fossil."'" However, like the fossils of Burgess
Shale described by Stephen Jay Gould,32 the language of sections
108 to 110 remains sufficiently general, unlike the more specific
planning); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (2006) (requiring a continuing planning
process for water quality); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (2006).
28 See Robert B. McKinstry, Jr., James McElfish & Michael Jacobson,
Coordination and Planning Tools That Can Be Applied to Biodiversity Conservation, in
BIODrVERSITY CONSERVATION HANDBOOK 203, 266-67, 203-05 (Robert B. McKinstry,
Jr., Coreen Ripp & Emily Lisy eds., 2006).
29 Clean Air Act § 110, 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (2006).
30 Clean Air Act §§ 108-110 (granting the EPA regulatory power to set NAAQS
and ozone emission standards as foundations of cap-and-trade programs).
31 ANPR, supra note 4, at 44362.
32 GOULD, supra note 1, at 47.
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provisions of later amendments, such that it can be readily adapted
to address new challenges, such as those presented by climate
change, while still engaging the range of governmental entities and
utilizing the range of tools necessary for this task.
II. Overview of State and Regional Climate Actions and a
Structure to Incorporate Those Actions into a National
Program Under the Clean Air Act.
States are currently on the forefront of climate change efforts
in the United States. These efforts are growing in size and number
and are even becoming international in scope. Thirty-three states
have already developed or are developing comprehensive climate
change mitigation plans or programs to achieve GHG emissions
reductions consistent with those required to stabilize the climate.33
These plans have generally been developed through bottom-up
stakeholder and technical-work-group-driven processes, and call
for the implementation of a portfolio of policy actions reaching
across the entire economy, with initiatives in: energy supply;
transportation and land use; residential, commercial and industrial
facilities; agriculture, forestry and waste; and cross-cutting issues
such as reporting and registries.34 Each portfolio of actions uses a
combination of appropriate instruments that most economically
enables emissions reductions through means such as codes and
standards, funding incentives, cap-and-trade programs, negotiated
agreements, and reporting and disclosure.35 Because these state
planning processes have relied upon the development of best
available state or local data and stakeholder input on policy
selection and design, they have identified cost-effective policies to
reduce GHG emissions. If applied nationally, these policies could
allow the United States to reduce emissions to 10% below 1990
levels by the year 2020, at a net annual economic savings of $20.8
billion in 2012, $85 billion in 2020, and $535.5 billion
33 See Ctr. for Climate Strategies, http://www.climatestrategies.us/ (last visited Feb.
10, 2009).
34 See Ctr. for Climate Strategies, Climate Policy Solutions that Work,
http://www.climatestrategies.us/ (follow "Policies that Work" hyperlink) (last visited
Feb. 10, 2009).
35 See Ctr. for Climate Strategies, Climate Policy Integration,
http://www.climatestrategies.us/ (follow "Policies that Work" hyperlink) (last visited
Feb. 10, 2009).
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cumulatively for 2009-2020.36 The experience of states has shown
that the lowest cost and highest value-added approach to the
attainment of the GHG emissions reduction targets and timetables
needed to stabilize the climate is achieved by a comprehensive
policy that involves all economic sectors, all levels of government
and a combination of policy instruments.37
The states have also created three regional cap-and-trade
initiatives that can serve as the foundation for a national cap-and-
trade program: the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI),38
the Western Governors Climate Initiative (WCI),3 9 and the
Midwestern Governor's Association Greenhouse Gas Reduction
Accord (MGA).4 ° Thirty-nine states, six Mexican states and all
twelve Canadian provinces have created The Climate Registry
(TCR), an emissions registry establishing uniform standards for
reporting and verification of emissions and emissions reductions."
36 See CTR. FOR CLIMATE STRATEGIES, POL'Y & PROGRAM OPPORTUNITIES, supra
note 15, at 3, and discussion infra Part V.
37 CTR. FOR CLIMATE STRATEGIES, POL'Y & PROGRAM OPPORTUNITIES, supra note
15, at 3.
38 Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, http://www.rggi.org (last visited Feb. 10,
2009).
39 Western Climate Initiative, http://www.westernclimateinitiative.org (last visited
Feb. 10, 2009).
40 Midwest Governors Ass'n, Midwestern Energy Security & Climate Stewardship
Summit: Greenhouse Gas Accord (2007), available at http://www.midwestmgovernors.
org/Publications/Greenhouse%20gas%20accordLayout%20 1.pdf.
41 The Climate Registry, http://www.theclimateregistry.org/ (last visited Feb. 10,
2009). The initial compliance period for the RGGI program, covering New York, New
Jersey, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont,
Delaware and Maryland began on January 1, 2009 and the first two quarterly auctions of
allowances took place on September 25, 2008 and December 17, 2008. See Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative, supra note 38 (follow "CO 2 Auctions" hyperlink; then follow
"Auction Results" hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 10, 2009). In addition, in January 2009,
the ten RGGI states and Pennsylvania announced their intent to develop a regional law
carbon fuel standard to reduce GHG emissions from the transportation sector. See
Nathanael Greene, 11 States Move to Develop a Low-Carbon Fuel Standard, THE
HUFFINGTON POST, Jan. 9, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/nathanael-greene/11-
states-move-to-developb_l56725.html. The seven western states (Arizona, California,
Montana, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, and Washington) and four Canadian provinces
(British Columbia, Manitoba, Ontario, and Quebec) participating in WCI have developed
Design Recommendations for the WCI Regional Cap-and-Trade Program. WESTERN
CLIMATE INITIATIVE, DESIGN RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE WCI REGIONAL CAP-AND-
TRADE PROGRAM (2008), available at http://www.westclimateinitiative.org/ewebeditpro/
items/0104F19865.PDF. The governors of six Midwestern states (Minnesota, Michigan,
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Although some have argued that it would be preferable to
displace state efforts with a single federal program,42 there are at
least five reasons for designing a federal GHG emissions reduction
program that incorporates these state and regional programs rather
than displaces them. First, it is critical that federal efforts not
interfere with state and regional progress, either by slowing
implementation of existing programs or by depriving the states of
the revenues critical for program success. Because GHGs have
extremely long residence times in the atmosphere, achieving the
international goal of preventing dangerous anthropogenic
interference with the climate system43 becomes increasingly
difficult as actions to reduce emissions are delayed. Second, a
federal program must be designed to engage state and local
governments fully as partners in the national effort, because some
reductions will necessarily be implemented through policy actions
over which state and local governments have primary or sole
jurisdiction. Areas such as land use regulation; building codes;
transportation infrastructure and management; utility regulation;
and the regulation of agriculture, forestry, and non-hazardous
waste handling and reduction are all traditionally within state or
local authority." Major GHG emissions reductions from these
sectors will be necessary to stabilize GHG concentrations in the
Wisconsin, Kansas, Iowa and Illinois) and the premier of Manitoba participating in
MGA are working on the development of mutual goals and the design of a third regional
cap-and-trade system that may be incorporated into one of the existing regional
programs. See Midwest Governors Association, supra note 40, at 4.
42 See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL EMISSIONS TRADING ASS'N, MAKING THE CASE FOR A
FEDERAL GREENHOUSE GAS OFFSETS PROGRAM, http://www.ieta.orgieta/www/pages/get
file.php?doclD=2968 (last visited Mar. 26, 2009) (181 corporate member association
arguing that a federal program would benefit the United States in global markets); Bus.
COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE ENERGY, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A FEDERAL GREENHOUSE
GAS OFFSET PROGRAM (2007), http://www.climatetrust.org/pdfs/PR/BCSEOffset_
Principles.pdf (providing recommendations for mandatory compliance with federal
offset program); see also Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 110-161 (2007)
(requiring the EPA to publish draft rule mandating disclosure of GHGs by states).
43 UNFCCC, supra note 6, at art. 2.
44 See, e.g., Forest Service Fire & Aviation Management, Links to State Forestry
Pages, http://www.fs.fed.us/fire/partners/fepp/sf links.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2009);
U.S. Department of Energy, State Policy, http://appsleere.energy.gov/states/statepolicy.
cfm (last visited Mar. 26, 2009); USDA, State Departments of Public Health and
Agriculture, http://www.fsis.usda.gov/fsisrecalls/state departments of publichealth/
(last visited Mar. 26, 2009) (illustrating the ambit of authority of state and local
governments in these areas).
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atmosphere at a level that will prevent dangerous anthropogenic
interference with the climate system. By contrast, even the
elimination of all emissions from sources traditionally regulated
pursuant to section 11 1 of the Clean Air Act45 will not achieve the
necessary reductions. Third, sector-based policies and measures
reduce the cost of cap-and-trade programs by removing market
barriers to market based systems and using non-price mechanisms
that can be less expensive than price mechanisms in key areas.46
Fourth, state involvement and planning will also be required to
identify the most cost-effective, comprehensive mix of GHG
reduction measures for all sectors and levels of government, as
indicated by the experience of the states described below. Fifth,
and finally, the use of a variety of sector based policies and
measures chosen with state input allows consideration of co-
benefits in ways that uniform federal programs or price-based
systems may exclude. This includes co-benefits such as energy
security and independence, human health protection, reduction of
sprawl and open space conservation, and economic development.
Nevertheless, federal action is required to provide federal
floors, to mandate participation by all states, to address markets
that cross state borders, and to provide coordination among states.
The statutory framework created by the Clean Air Act provides
both the authority and the flexibility to incorporate and support
state actions in an integrated federal framework for GHG
emissions reduction, and involves the type of state level planning
that would tailor an approach appropriate for each state's legal and
political structure, its climate, and its resources. The Clean Air
Act contains a mix of federal floors and requirements for those
states that have failed to do the job, but leaves a significant role for
states choosing to act in areas beyond federal authority and
45 This section refers to limiting emissions of "stationary sources," which include
"any building, structure, facility or installation which emits or may emit any air
pollutant." Clean Air Act § 11 l(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 741 l(a)(3) (2006).
46 They do so by removing market barriers (such as split incentives) and by
providing non-price instruments for actions that do not fully respond to price
mechanisms. By reducing emissions in critical economic sectors, these approaches also
reduce demand for emissions allowances. A sector-based approach can also ensure that
all sectors are fully engaged in attainment of economy-wide goals so that no single sector
is disproportionately burdened, particularly where cap-and-trade programs may not cover
all sectors.
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seeking to initiate new actions.47 In Massachusetts v. EPA, the
Supreme Court held that GHGs are pollutants that can be regulated
under the Clean Air Act.48 The Clean Air Act provides federal
floors in the form of national technology-based standards,49 and
NAAQS.5 ° Of particular importance is the fact that the statute
mandates a significant role for state-level planning by requiring
states to develop SIPs providing "for implementation,
maintenance, and enforcement" of the NAAQS, but maintains
federal primacy by providing for EPA supervision and approval of
these SIPs.5"
States are given a wide leeway in determining what types of
measures are best suited for achieving and maintaining the
NAAQS.52 SIPs may incorporate both traditional regulatory
mechanisms and market-based mechanisms, such as cap-and-trade
programs of the sort already being developed or a GHG tax.53 The
SIP mechanism described in the statute (as opposed to that applied
in the past for other pollutants) can be adapted to allow the federal
government: to incorporate existing state climate planning and
implementation measures, including cap-and-trade; to motivate
state action in areas where Congress has not currently authorized
the Administration to act; and to continue to motivate new state
climate action.54
Addressing the global issue of climate change and the unique
attributes of GHGs will require that state climate implementation
47 See generally Clean Air Act § 110 (mandating state implementation plans, but
leaving specifics of methodology and procedures to the states themselves).
48 Mass. v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 529 (2007).
49 See generally Clean Air Act §§ 111, 202, 213, 231 (laying out technology
standards for the likes of stationary sources, motor vehicle and aircraft engine
emissions).
50 See id. § 109(a)(1)(A).
51 Id § I I0(a)(1).
52 Id. § 110 (mandating state implementation plans while leaving the specifics of
methodology and procedures to the states themselves).
53 See id. § 1 l0(a)(2)(A).
54 Id. This is particularly important for the implementation of sector-based
measures that remove barriers to actions that may not fully be addressed at the federal
level. For instance, many barriers to energy efficiency and conservation are found in
state codes and standards that discourage or even prohibit efficient technologies and
practices (such as outmoded building and development codes or utility rate structures)
that must be modified at the local and state level.
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plans (SCIPs) and federal oversight of those plans be quite
different from SIPs addressing traditional priority pollutants and
federal oversight of those SIPs as described in current EPA
regulations." SIPs for priority pollutants regulated under the
Clean Air Act have, in the past, focused on local concentrations of
pollutants that disperse rapidly.56 Given the lengthy residence
times of GHGs in the atmosphere, in order to maintain
atmospheric levels of GHGs below dangerous levels, the United
States will be required to significantly reduce emissions long
before GHG concentrations reach the point of dangerous
interference with the climate system.57 As described further
below, SCIPs, like the state climate plans already developed, will
need to focus on achieving decreasing levels of overall emissions
rather than on irrelevant local concentrations and local modeling
(as under the current SIP regime)." The statutory language allows
the planning mechanism established under section 110 of the
Clean Air Act59 to be used to assign each state declining emissions
allowances that could be achieved through its SCIP.6°
A somewhat different approach to regulation than has been
used for other priority pollutants under the Clean Air Act is
justified because GHGs are different from traditional priority
55 See generally Clean Air Act § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 7407 (2006) (illustrating current
regulations' limitation to each state's geographic area).
56 See, e.g., Montana State Implementation Plans, available at
http://deq.mt.gov/AirQuality/Planning/SIPs.asp (last visited Mar. 26, 2009) (illustrating
localized focus of SIPs).
57 I.e., in order to achieve the goal established by the UNFCCC, supra note 6, at
art. 2. The Fourth IPCC Report indicates that in order to limit temperature increases to
2* C, total GHG atmospheric levels must be restricted to a range of 445 to 490 ppmv
CO 2e (carbon dioxide equivalents - the common measure of all GHGs), as compared to
2005 levels of 375 ppmv CO 2e. To maintain GHGs at this level will require that world
net emissions be reduced by between 50 and 80% from 2000 levels by the year 2050.
See 4 TH IPCC SUMMARY FOR POL'YMAKERS, supra note 7, at 20; Hansen et al., supra note
7, at 226. Because the United States emits almost 15% of the world's GHGs with only
4.5% of the world's population, significantly greater reductions will be required in the
United States. See supra note 8.
58 See infra text accompanying notes 67-77.
59 See generally Clean Air Act § 110 (mandating the creation of SIPs).
60 See McKinstry, Jr. et al., Federal Climate Change Legislation, supra note 25, at
7; Peterson et al., Developing a Comprehensive Approach, supra note 19, at 231;
McKinstry, Jr. & Peterson, The Implications of the New "Old" Federalism, supra note
25, at 89; see also Doremus & Hanemann, supra note 25, at 820.
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pollutants in a number of ways. GHGs mix rapidly throughout the
atmosphere and persist in the atmosphere for a century or longer in
most cases.6 They are emitted throughout the world, with nearly
fifteen percent of world emissions coming from sources within the
United States.62 Changes in emissions levels will not produce
short-term impacts because there are significant lag times while
the climate system equilibrates.63 It is the average long term
concentration in the atmosphere and not short term or local levels
that affect global temperature. 64  Accordingly, stabilization of
GHG emissions levels in the atmosphere will require significant
emissions reductions long before ambient levels approach the
point at which "dangerous anthropogenic interference with the
climate system" will occur.65
A good plan will first establish goals. In so doing, policy
makers can proceed to identify the most efficient means of
achieving those goals and the trade-offs which might prove
necessary. Under the Clean Air Act, the goal for an air quality
standard is expressed as a NAAQS, with a secondary standard
established to protect welfare and a primary standard established
to protect health.6 While SIPs for other criteria pollutants have
focused on controlling local, ground-level concentrations, the
characteristics of GHGs require the achievement of emissions
reductions necessary for the United States to meet its "common
but differentiated responsibilit[y]" under the UNFCCC,6 and to
maintain levels of GHGs at a concentration low enough to prevent
"dangerous anthropogenic interference" with the climate system.68
The mix of regulatory options should therefore focus on achieving
61 See ANPR, supra note 4, at 44400.
62 See id at 44402.
63 See id. at 44401.
64 Id.
65 UNFCCC, supra note 6, at art.2. These characteristics of GHGs are discussed
by the EPA in ANPR, supra note 4, at 44400-01.
66 See Clean Air Act § 109(b)(1), (2), 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1), (2) (2008).
67 "The Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and
future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their
common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. Accordingly, the
developed country Parties should take the lead in combating climate change and the
adverse effects thereof." UNFCCC, supra note 6, at art. 3, § 1.
68 Id. at art. 2.
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phased emissions reductions consistent with long-term emissions
reduction goals. Most scientists are of the opinion that to prevent
significant adverse impacts on welfare, carbon dioxide levels need
to be held at or below approximately 450 ppmv.69 A secondary
NAAQS could be established at this level, triggering the need to
reduce emissions in order to maintain GHG levels below the
standard.7" Indeed, based on the understanding that worldwide
emissions will need to be reduced to stabilize GHG levels, many
states have already established interim and longer-term goals for
reduction of GHG emissions.7 Although these goals vary, many
include provisions for returning to ten percent below 1990 GHG
emissions levels by year 2020, and reducing emissions to eighty
percent below 1990 levels by 2050.72
An effective federal program will require a mix of measures to
69 The Fourth IPCC Report indicates that in order to limit temperature increases to
2°C, upon which the 450 ppmv is based, total GHG atmospheric levels must be restricted
to a range of 445 to 490 ppmv CO2e (carbon dioxide equivalents - the common measure
of all GHGs), as compared to 2005 levels of 375 ppmv CO 2e. See 4TH IPCC SUMMARY
FOR POL'YMAKERS, supra note 7, at 20. The European Union has also sought to aim for
a 2' C limit, although others have suggested that even this amount may be problematic.
Hansen et al., supra note 7, at 217.
70 As discussed further below, EPA should establish a secondary, welfare-based
NAAQS equal to the level required to stabilize GHGs at the level required by the
UNFCCC. See infra text accompanying notes 148-166. Although climate change can
affect health, most of the health effects are secondary impacts of welfare effects (e.g.
deaths from increased storminess, disease vectors moving north) rather than the types of
direct impacts (lung diseases) associated with pollutants for which a primary standard
has been established in the past. While there may be increased heat-related deaths, there
will be decreased cold-related deaths, so that setting a health-based standard on that basis
would be problematic. As a practical matter, because it appears that the NAAQS would
be set at a level above current ambient levels and emissions reductions will be required
as a part of a maintenance plan, it may not make a great deal of difference whether or not
the EPA adopts a primary standard.
71 See KRISTINA HADDAD, CLIMATE POLICY PROGRAM OF THE NEW AMERICA
FOUNDATION, U.S. STATES WITH GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS TARGETS (2007),
available at http://www.newamerica.net/files/States%20with%20GHG%20Reduction
%20Targets%208-18-08.pdf; see also New America Foundation, Climate Policy
Program: Climate Action Plans, http://www.newamerica.net/programs/climate/
buildingblocks/actionplans (last visited Feb. 7, 2009) (providing access to all existing
State climate action plans or their equivalents).
72 See PEW Ctr. on Global Climate Change, A Look at Emissions Targets,
www.pewclimate.org/what s beingdone/targets (last visited Feb. 9, 2009). This is
consistent with the findings of the 4TH IPCC SUMMARY FOR POL'YMAKERS, supra note 7,
at 20.
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achieve these goals and federal floors to assure that all states and
all sectors participate. This mix should include categorical
emissions standards under sections 111, 202, 213, and 231 of the
Clean Air Act73 for new and modified sources of GHG emissions,
and state climate plans that would select a portfolio of actions
appropriate for each state. The EPA could utilize the GHG
inventories and forecasts that thirty-one states have already
developed under their climate planning efforts74 in order to
determine the state by state emissions reduction goals necessary to
achieve the national emissions reduction goals. The EPA can then
require that each state develop a climate plan to meet its particular
goal and promulgate a federal plan where a state fails to do so.
Much of the discussion about federal legislation has focused
on the use of cap-and-trade and other market-based programs.
Those tools should and will, in most cases, be a part of the mix of
measures used to achieve the states' required emissions reduction,
but should be only a part. As discussed in greater detail below,
economic modeling has shown that many GHG emissions
reduction measures have a negative net cost per ton of emissions
reduced, suggesting that there may be significant market
imperfections or barriers that require a variety of measures rather
than reliance on market mechanisms alone.75
73 Clean Air Act §§ 111, 202, 213, 231, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411, 7521, 7547, 7571
(2006).
74 See, e.g., TOM PETERSON, CTR. FOR CLIMATE STRATEGIES, REVISED DRAFT
NORTH CAROLINA GREENHOUSE GAS INVENTORY AND REFERENCE CASE PROJECTIONS
1990-2020 (2006), http://www.ncclimatechange.us/ewebeditpro/items/O120F8235.pdf;
STEPHEN ROE ET AL., CTR. FOR CLIMATE STRATEGIES, ALASKA GREENHOUSE GAS
INVENTORY AND REFERENCE CASE PROJECTIONS 1990-2020 (2007),
http://www.dec.state.ak.us/air/doc/AK-GHG-EI-2007.pdf, RANDY STRAIT ET AL., CTR.
FOR CLIMATE STRATEGIES, COLORADO GREENHOUSE GAS INVENTORY AND REFERENCE
CASE PROJECTIONS 1990-2020 (2007), http://www.cdphe.state.co.us/ap/down/
GHGEIJan07.pdf (illustrating the climate planning efforts of various states that might be
used by the EPA).
75 All too often, the proponents of market-based approaches will establish a false
dichotomy between what they characterize as "command and control" approaches and
market-based approaches and suggest replacing "command and control" wholesale with
cap-and-trade. In fact, both traditional and market-based approaches rely heavily on
market incentives; likewise, any market-based system must necessarily rely heavily on a
number of command and control mechanisms. A mix of approaches for different sectors
and even different activities within a sector will produce the most workable and cost-
effective policy tool. See, e.g., David M. Driesen, Trading and Its Limits, 14 PENN. ST.
ENVTL. L. REv. 169, 172 (2006) (discussing important limitations on when trading
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Nevertheless, these market mechanisms have important
advantages that implicate the need for their continued
incorporation into whatever plan is devised. Cap-and-trade and
other market-based programs may be made a part of an SIP under
the express authority of section 1 10(a)(2)(A) of the Clean Air
Act.76 Because there are clear advantages in having sufficient
consistency to establish a national trading regime in GHG
emissions reduction credits, the EPA could facilitate such a regime
by promulgating regulations setting forth minimum performance
criteria for a cap-and-trade system that could be approved by the
EPA as a part of an SCIP. 77 These criteria could also set forth the
should and should not be used as a policy tool); David M. Driesen, Is Emissions Trading
an Economic Incentive Program?: Replacing the Command and Control/Economic
Incentive Dichotomy, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 289, 343 (1998) (emphasizing how
government decision making must be combined with more free market economic
incentives); Robert B. McKinstry, Jr., Putting the Market to Work for Conservation: The
Evolving Use of Market-Based Mechanisms to Achieve Environmental Improvement In
and Across Multiple Media, 14 PENN. ST. ENvTL. L. REv. 151, 158-60 (2006) (discussing
limitations on use of trading mechanisms).
76 Clean Air Act § 110(a)(2)(A).
77 Id. Although the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia invalidated a
federally created cap-and-trade system for other pollutants established by the Clean Air
Interstate Rule (CAIR) in N.C. v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896 (D.C. Cir. 2008), the concerns here
are distinguishable because of the differences between GHGs and the pollutants at issue
in N.C. v. EPA. There, the court focused in particular on two issues that are not present
for GHGs, and that decision is therefore distinguishable and inapplicable here.
First, the court focused on the fact that, with a cap-and-trade program, there
could be no assurances that emissions from individual sources in one state would not
cause violations of ground level NAAQS or interfere with maintenance of NAAQS in
another and therefore would not satisfy the statutory criteria. See id at 918. As noted,
local ground level concentrations of GHGs are largely irrelevant to the atmospheric
standard. The harm to public welfare does not arise from local, temporary exceedences
but from GHGs exceeding the NAAQS throughout the atmosphere after mixing. These
differences would support the establishment of a national maintenance plan based on
emissions loadings and the establishment of a cap-and-trade program as a mechanism to
maintain levels below the NAAQS.
Second, the court focused on the fact that the reductions in sulfur dioxide
emissions would have the effect of taking away emissions rights created by the acid rain
cap-and-trade system. See id. at 917. Since there is no statutory program creating
emissions rights, the decision is also distinguishable. Moreover, the court of appeals
later modified its decision invalidating and vacating the CAIR so as to allow for it to
stand while the EPA reconsidered the Rule on remand. See N.C. v. EPA, No. 05-1244,
on petition for reh'g, 550 F.3d 1176 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 23, 2008). The CAIR was not
vacated, but the court did not reverse any of its findings on the flaws of the CAIR. This
decision is curious, in that the flaws most applicable to GHGs went to the question of the
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mechanisms that the EPA might employ if it becomes necessary to
impose a federal implementation plan (FIP).
In developing a cap-and-trade program, it is important to
maintain flexibility so that existing practices can be retained and
incorporated into a federal program and so states can select the
most cost-effective mix of market and non-market mechanisms in
light of each state's legal structure. To facilitate this goal, the
performance criteria could allow automatic approval of existing
programs, including the WCI and RGGI regional cap-and-trade
programs, and could allow the states flexibility to decide which
elements of their GHG emissions reduction programs should be
satisfied by a cap-and-trade program. Because no SIP could be
approved unless the entire mix of measures achieved the necessary
reductions, 78 states could allow different sectors to utilize cap-and-
trade and generate different offsets as credits. Once a state system
was approved, the credits could be traded across state lines as long
as they were created in accordance with permitted volume and
standards established in the originating state, and used as
permitted in the state where they are retired.
This flexibility would likely produce a more cost-effective and
politically acceptable GHG emission reduction program than
would a one-size-fits-all program, since differences in state legal
systems and areas where emissions reductions can be achieved
often will require different mixes of cap-and-trade and other
measures. 79  This type of approach has worked to create an
very authority to impose a cap-and-trade program. Although the modification includes
very little in the way of reasoning, it can be read to say that cap-and-trade may be
required to address criteria pollutants, but the EPA must still assure that there are no
ground level violations of the NAAQS. In other words, cap-and-trade can be imposed to
solve part of the problem, but no source can contribute to violations of the NAAQS or
non-attainment in another state. This would support use of a cap-and-trade to address
GHGs under the current structure of the Clean Air Act, since ground level issues should
not arise. More importantly, this decision lends further support to the notion that cap-
and-trade should be part of a portfolio of measures rather than a "magic bullet."
78 See Clean Air Act § 110(a) (mandating creation of SIPs sufficient to meet
minimum federal requirements and reductions as demanded by the NAAQS).
79 See, e.g., FRANZ LITZ & KATHRYN ZYLA, WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE,
FEDERALISM IN THE GREENHOUSE: DEFINING A ROLE FOR STATES IN A FEDERAL CAP-AND-
TRADE PROGRAM 7 (2008), available at http://pdf.wri.org/federalism in thegreenhouse
.pdf (recommending a hybrid approach between federal and state efforts); see also
Doremus & Hanemann, supra note 25, at 821.
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international trading program within the European Union" and
could work equally well in the United States.
Relying on state plans to identify the mix of measures
appropriate for each state, as proposed here within a federal
framework and in concert with uniform federal approaches for
some programs, will promote the most economically efficient
approach to achieving the GHG emissions reductions necessary to
stabilize atmospheric GHG levels. Each state has important
differences in climate, resources, transportation, legal structures
for local governments, finance, and utility regulation.81 Because
of these differences, individualized consideration of the mix of
GHG emissions reduction measures, strategies, and market and
non-market approaches and the appropriate mix of federal, state,
and local responsibilities will produce a more cost-effective
response than a federal one-size-fits-all approach. We have
developed cost-effectiveness curves for the individualized climate
plans that have been developed by twenty states and scaled those
experiences up to the national level to demonstrate the reductions
that could be achieved if similar plans were implemented in all
fifty states.8 2  This scale-up shows that state climate plans can
achieve reductions of emissions to ten percent below 1990 levels
by 2020 at a net economy-wide annual cost savings of $85.065
billion for 2020 and net cumulative savings of $535.5 billion for
the period 2009 to 2020 on a present value basis.83
80 The European Union's Emissions Trading Scheme assigns reduction targets to
each European nation and allows each nation to develop its own emissions reduction
plan that includes trading elements, but allows EU wide trading of the credits created for
trading in each nation. See generally Council Directive 2003/87/EC, 2003 O.J. (L 275)
32-46 (describing greenhouse emission allowances within the European Community);
Council Directive 2004/101/EC, 2004 O.J. (L 338) 18-23 (establishing a scheme for
emissions in compliance with the Kyoto Protocol); Commission Regulation 2216/2004,
2004 O.J. (L 386) 1-155 (setting up standardized and secured system of emission
registries); Commission Regulation 994/2008, 2008 O.J. (L 271) 1-50 (elaborating on
system of registries), available at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/emission/
implementation en.htm. This system has created a vigorous trading regime with an
active futures market on the European climate exchange. See European Climate
Exchange, http://www.europeanclimate exchange.com/default-flash.asp (last visited
Jan. 4, 2009).
81 See supra note 44.
82 For the states and sources of data used here, see supra note 14 and
accompanying text.
83 See THE CTR. FOR CLIMATE STRATEGIES, CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY AS ECONOMIC
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This analysis also suggests that these emissions reductions and
net cost savings cannot be achieved without a state-by-state
planning mechanism and a range of sector based policies and
measures that use both price and non-price policy instruments.
They certainly cannot be achieved through the simple categorical
emissions control standards under section 11 1 and the various
mobile source authorities of the Clean Air Act.84 Many of the
most cost-effective emissions reductions fall within areas that
cannot be consistently covered by categorical standards, such as
land use, residential and commercial building codes, zoning,
resource conservation, and changes in agriculture and forestry
practices.85 Even where regulatory authority exists, such as over
fossil fuel-fired electric generating units, cost-effective reductions
will require actions to reduce demand for electricity, an area not
regulated under the applicable section of the Clean Air Act,
section I I L" Categorical standards have historically focused on
programs that capture or otherwise reduce emissions from a
particular technology.87 For carbon dioxide, this would mean
technologies for carbon dioxide capture and sequestration (CCS),
which have not yet been shown to be commercially feasible or
cost effective at a full plant or market level.88 There are, however,
many cost- effective reductions in the electricity generation sector
STIMULUS: EVIDENCE AND OPPORTUNITIES FROM THE STATES 4 (Nov. 2008), available at
www.climatestrategies.us/ewebeditpro/items/025F20494.pdf, see also CTR. FOR
CLIMATE STRATEGIES, POL'Y & PROGRAM OPPORTUNITIES, supra note 15, at 3 (showing
significant opportunities for economic stimulus from climate change programs).
84 Categorical emissions standards are numeric maximum emissions limitations
established for specific constituents emitted for particular sources, such as light vehicles,
trucks, various types of off-road vehicles, and various specific industrial sources and
pieces of equipment. See Clean Air Act §§ 111, 202, 213, 23 It, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411,
7521, 7547, 7571 (2006). For example, the categorical standards for various stationary
sources for other pollutants are set forth in 40 C.F.R. pt. 60 (2008) and the categorical
standards for other pollutants for on-road vehicle engines are set forth in 40 C.F.R. pt. 86
(2008).
85 This is largely due to the fact that these areas are mostly regulated by individual
states and are thus correspondingly disparate. See supra note 44.
86 Clean Air Act § 111.
87 See id § 108(b)(1) (requiring the Administrator to issue information regarding
emission reduction technologies).
88 Elizabeth C. Brodeen, Sequestration, Science and the Law: An Analysis of the
Sequestration Component of the California and Northeastern States' Plans to Curb
Global Warming, 37 ENVTL. L. 1217, 1223-24 (2007).
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that will arise from either a shift to different low or zero carbon
electric generation sources or to energy efficiency and
conservation measures in homes, businesses, and industry. These
measures cannot be required of electricity generating sources
under section 111 of the Clean Air Act 9 and control over many of
them fall within spheres of regulation traditionally occupied
exclusively by state and local governments, such as building
codes.9"
Many of the most cost-effective GHG emission reductions
cannot be achieved through the cap-and-trade mechanism without
state planning to facilitate cost reductions or the operation of such
a market mechanism.9 The CCS scale-up results show that there
are many measures whose implementation will result in a
significant net cost savings per ton of GHG emissions reduced
(i.e., they appear as net negative costs).92 The fact that these
measures are not being implemented today suggests that there are
market imperfections or barriers that are not solely related to
emissions price incentives, indicating that it may be more effective
to implement non-market-based (or non-price) strategies. Barriers
include state utility regulations that prevent electricity users from
bearing many costs of pollution and therefore eliminating
89 Clean Air Act § 111. Some emissions reductions might be achieved by imposing
requirements for conservation and energy efficiency on buildings under the New Source
Review provisions of the Clean Air Act when emissions of GHGs from building sources
such as fossil fuel-fired HVAC units trigger best available control technology
requirements. See id. § 165(a)(4) (Prevention of Significant Deterioration program
requiring best available technology for new or modified major emitting sources). See
also ANPR, supra note 4, at 44354 (summarizing the potential ramifications of EPA
regulation of greenhouse gases in response to Massachusetts v. EPA); ANPR, supra note
4, at 44497-44510 (discussing the potential effects on the preconstruction permitting
process if the EPA were to regulate greenhouse gases). However, even if New Source
Review requirements could be used to require some energy efficiency measures, this
mechanism would still not reach homes and many commercial sources and could result
in increased demand for electricity due to switching from fossil fuel-fired HVAC sources
to electric sources.
90 John C. Dernbach, Overcoming the Behavioral Impetus for Greater U.S. Energy
Consumption, 20 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL Bus. & DEV. L. J. 15, 22-24 (2007).
91 Adam Rose, Dan Wei, Jeff Wennberg, & Thomas Peterson, Climate Change
Policy Formation in Minnesota: The Case for a Regional Approach, in THE
ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY (Adam Rose, ed.) (forthcoming 2009);
Doremus & Hanemann, supra note 25, at 811-16, 826-30.
92 Rose et al., supra note 91 (manuscript at 14-15, on file with authors).
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incentives for energy savings created by cost savings; the inability
of homeowners or mortgage markets to assess cost-effectiveness
of energy saving measures in home-buying decisions; a common
dichotomy between the owners and investors of energy saving
measures and those who actually incur the operating costs or
realize the cost savings; the lack of mechanisms to aggregate
capital and direct it to many small cost-effective projects, such as
home energy efficiency and conservation measures; and,
generally, the lack of incentives to attain unpriced co-benefits such
as human health, environmental protection, or equitable
distribution. State climate plans have identified a number of
approaches that states can use to remove barriers or imperfections
as well as non-market mechanisms to overcome them. The SCIP
approach suggested here will allow each state to adopt the mix of
measures that will be most cost-effective and legally effective in
light of that state's unique characteristics.93  This careful
consideration of the appropriate mix of measures can only be
achieved through an individualized state-by-state planning process
involving stakeholders familiar with the individual state's legal,
economic and natural environments.
III. Goal Setting Through Listing Air Quality Criteria and
NAAQS for GHGs.
The nature of GHGs makes long-term planning and goal
setting crucial. Since GHGs have a long residence time, their
impacts are delayed. They are generated by infrastructure that has
a long lifetime and requires long lead times for financing and
construction.94 For these reasons, planning and implementation of
control measures must begin many decades before significant
problems manifest themselves, and must continue over many years
as well. Moreover, given the fact that there is still scientific
uncertainty regarding the sensitivity of the climate system to
various levels of GHGs,95 there must be sufficient flexibility built
into the system to allow goals to be adjusted as new scientific
evidence becomes available.96 However, there must be sufficient
93 See infra text accompanying notes 148-200.
94 INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007:
SYNTHESIS REPORT 36-41, 56-61 (2008) [hereinafter 4TH IPCC REPORT].
95 See Hansen et al., supra note 7, at 227-28.
96 Id.
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certainty regarding demand for low carbon fuels and electricity to
provide confidence regarding returns to capital markets.
The Clean Air Act provides the flexibility to adapt to the
problem of limiting GHG emissions; it allows the type of long-
term adaptive management necessary to meet the challenge and
calls for planning with a significant state role. It establishes long-
term goals in the form of NAAQS 97 and calls for each state to
develop a plan to achieve or to maintain those standards and to
integrate federal minimum standards, using the mix of measures
most appropriate for the state.98 Although state planning has in the
past focused on modeling to maintain local concentrations, the
legislative structure is sufficiently flexible to allow the EPA to
establish state by state emissions goals and to adjust those goals
based on new scientific evidence and the experience of the states.
Moreover, as evidenced by the Supreme Court's mandate in
Massachusetts v. EPA, 99 the Clean Air Act includes sufficient
specificity to allow judicial intervention when either the
Administration or the states fail to meet their responsibilities. The
first step, however, is the establishment of a health or welfare
based goal.
A. Listing GHGs as Priority Pollutants and Developing Air
Quality Criteria Under Section 108 of the Clean Air Act
and National Ambient Air Quality Standards Under
Section 109.
Under the current law, NAAQS should be established for
GHGs. Those NAAQS can serve as the goal guiding both EPA
rulemaking and state climate plans. Specifically, given the state of
the science as described by the EPA in the ANPR, 0 by leading
scientists in the IPCC,'0° and in numerous surveys by National
Research Council panels of the National Academy of Sciences,10 2
97 Clean Air Act § 109, 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (2006).
98 Clean Air Act § 110.
99 Mass. v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
100 ANPR, supra note 4, at 44367.
101 See generally 4' IPCC SUMMARY FOR POL'YMAKERS, supra note 7.
102 See, e.g., COMM. ON SURFACE TEMPERATURE RECONSTRUCTIONS FOR THE LAST
2,000 YEARS, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, SURFACE TEMPERATURE RECONSTRUCTIONS
FOR THE LAST 2,000 YEARS (2006); COMM. ON ABRUPT CLIMATE CHANGE, NAT'L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, ABRUPT CLIMATE CHANGE: INEVITABLE SURPRISES (2002); COMM.
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the EPA is now legally required to list GHGs as priority pollutants
and develop air quality criteria under section 108 of the Clean Air
Act.'0 3 That listing will trigger the requirement for the EPA to
establish NAAQS under section 109,10' and to require the
submission of SIPs under section 110. 05 Under section 108(a) of
the Clean Air Act,'0 6 the EPA has a mandatory duty to list each air
pollutant (A) whose "emissions . . . cause or contribute to air
pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public
health or welfare; (B) the presence of which in the ambient air
results from numerous or diverse mobile or stationary sources; and
(C) for which air quality criteria had not been issued before
December 31, 1970. ' ' 107 It appears that the applicable standards
for listing pertain to GHGs.
First, the endangerment standard is satisfied based on EPA's
own findings to date. In remanding the question whether GHG
emissions "cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may
reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare"'0 8
in Massachusetts v. EPA, the Supreme Court narrowly
ON THE SCIENCE OF CLIMATE CHANGE, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, CLIMATE CHANGE
SCIENCE: AN ANALYSIS OF SOME KEY QUESTIONS (2001).
103 Clean Air Act § 108.
104 Id. § 109.
105 Id. § 110.
106 Id. § 108(a).
107 Id. See also NRDC v. Train, 545 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1976) (requiring the EPA to
list lead under section 108 of the Clean Air Act and to establish NAAQS for lead).
NRDC v. Train held that the additional language in section 108-"but for which he plans
to issue air quality criteria under this section"-does not change the mandatory nature of
the duty to list. NRDC, 545 F.2d at 325. In the ANPR, the EPA raised the possibility
that the decision in Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984),
may change that conclusion. ANPR, supra note 4, at 44477 n. 229. However, there is
nothing in Chevron's holding regarding the deference owed agency determinations in the
area of the agency's expertise that would appear to overturn the simple issue of statutory
interpretation resolved in NRDC v. Train. In NRDC v. Train, the court specifically
rejected the argument that the phrase "but for which he plans to issue air quality criteria
under this section" made the decision to list lead one within the discretion of the
Administrator. NRDC, 545 F.2d at 325. Moreover, Congress modified the Clean Air
Act in the 1977 Amendments specifically to endorse the scientific basis underlying the
listing of lead. See H.R. REP. No. 95-294, at 11 (1977), as reprinted in 1977
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1077, 1088. Far from modifying the statute to provide the EPA with
greater discretion not to act, Congress specifically directed that the EPA act to address
risks before something bad actually happens. Id.
108 Clean Air Act § 202(a)(1).
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circumscribed the EPA's discretion, holding:
Under the clear terms of the Clean Air Act, EPA
can avoid taking further action only if it determines
that greenhouse gases do not contribute to climate
change or if it provides some reasonable
explanation as to why it cannot or will not exercise
its discretion to determine whether they do. Ibid.
To the extent that this constrains agency discretion
to pursue other priorities of the Administrator or the
President, this is the congressional design.'0 9
The state of the science outlined by the staff in the ANPR 11°
and the EPA's findings made in denying California's request for a
waiver from preemption of its GHG automobile emissions
standards under section 209(b) of the Clean Air Act"' enumerated
many risks from rising levels of GHGs that endanger welfare" 12
These include sea level rise from thermal expansion and melting
of continental glaciers, increased drought stress, decreased storage
of water in snow pack, disruption of winter sports, increased
storminess, exacerbation of ozone pollution, disruption of existing
ecosystems and ecosystem services, and migration of pests and
tropical diseases northward." 3  These findings indicate a
reasonable likelihood that without reductions in GHG emissions,
there is a risk that welfare will be impaired to the point of meeting
the statutory threshold for endangerment."4
It also appears that the other two criteria for listing are present.
109 Mass. v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 533 (2007).
110 ANPR, supra note 4, at 44423-37.
111 Clean Air Act § 209(b).
112 California State Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Standards, 73 Fed. Reg. 12156,
12165-68 (EPA May 27, 2008). On January 26, 2009, President Obama reversed the
denial and directed EPA to grant the waiver. Memorandum from President Barack
Obama to the Administrator of the EPA (Jan. 26, 2009), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/thepressoffice/CaliforniaRequest_
forWaiverUnder theCleanAirAct.
113 California State Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Standards, 73 Fed. Reg. at
12163-68. These findings are consistent with the scientific facts described by leading
scientists of the world in the Fourth Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change. See 4T IPCC REPORT, supra note 94, at 30-33.
114 Under the Clean Air Act, the Administrator of the EPA is required to issue
NAAQS for any air pollutant "which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public
health or welfare." Clean Air Act § 108(a)(1)(A).
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The EPA's findings in the ANPR establish that "the presence of..
. [GHGs] in the ambient air results from numerous or diverse
mobile or stationary sources."' 5 The EPA found that GHGs are
emitted from millions of sources throughout the nation and across
all sectors of the economy, including all of the mobile sources that
burn fossil fuel; home and commercial heating and cooking with
oil, natural gas, and coal; fossil-fuel-fired energy generation;
agricultural, forestry, and waste operations; land use changes;
industrial processes such as cement and ammonia manufacturing;
and industrial energy generation units. 16  Finally, there is no
question that the EPA has not yet issued air quality criteria for
GHGs." Thus, all three criteria for listing under section 10818
are satisfied and it appears that the EPA has a non-discretionary
duty to list GHGs.
There is a question as to what pollutant or pollutants should be
listed." 9 There are multiple GHGs with different radiative forcing
potential: 20 carbon dioxide (C0 2 ), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide
(N20), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs) and
sulfur hexafluoride (SF 6).121 Should these be listed collectively or
individually, and, if collectively, how should they be treated?
It would appear to make the most sense for the EPA to list all
GHGs collectively as a single pollutant under the Clean Air Act to
adjust the weighting given to each individual pollutant to reflect its
radiative forcing potential in terms of carbon dioxide equivalents
(CO 2e). This is the standard procedure that has been adopted
internationally under the UNFCCC and in the state and regional
programs that have regulated GHGs to date. 122  The Climate
115 Clean Air Act § 108(a)(1)(B).
116 ANPR, supra note 4, at 44401-03, 44429-37, 44453-54, 44462,44468.
117 Id. at 44354.
118 See Clean Air Act § 108.
119 ANPR, supra note 4, at 44400-05.
120 I.e., global warming potential.
121 4 TH IPCC REPORT, supra note 94, at 36-37.
122 See Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC, Geneva, Switz., July 8-19, 1996,
Methodological Issues Related to the Kyoto Protocol 3, available at
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop3 /07a01.pdf#page=31; see, e.g., MINNESOTA CLIMATE
CHANGE ADVISORY GROUP, FINAL REPORT 2-1 (2008), available at
http://www.nmclimatechange.us/ewebeditpro/items/O3F16693.pdf; NORTH CAROLINA
CLIMATE ACTION PLAN ADVISORY GROUP, RECOMMENDED MITIGATION OPTIONS FOR
CONTROLLING GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS 2-1 (2008), available at
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Registry's General Reporting Protocol, to which thirty-nine states
in the United States, all twelve Canadian provinces, and six
Mexican states have subscribed, requires reporting of all six major
GHGs, adjusted to CO 2e. •' This approach is analogous to the
approach that the EPA took in listing ozone as a pollutant under
the Clean Air Act and then only regulating the wide variety of
pollutants that cause ozone, various photochemical oxidants and
nitrogen oxides.'24
There seems to be no good reason for departing from this
approach. Because virtually all of Canada, a majority of the
United States, and the six Mexican border states subscribe to this
method, 25 it is already in effect in most of North America.
Moreover, retaining this practice would better enable the United
States programs to be harmonized with existing international
programs, including trading programs.
Listing of a pollutant under section 108 of the Clean Air Act 126
creates a mandatory duty to issue "air quality criteria .
reflect[ing] the latest scientific knowledge"' 27 relating to the
impacts on health or welfare caused by the pollutant and
"information on air pollution control techniques" 128 for the
pollutant. These provide the scientific basis for developing
NAAQS and provide information that is useful both to states in
developing state implementation plans and to the EPA in making
decisions regarding technology-based standards and permitting
decisions.
Some critics of the Clean Air Act have suggested that the air
quality criteria and information requirement will be cause for
http://www.ncclimatechange.us/ewebeditpro/items/O120F19992.pdf, CALIFORNIA AIR
RESOURCES BOARD, CLIMATE CHANGE PROPOSED SCOPING PLAN 11 (2008), available at
http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/scopingplan/ document/psp.pdf.
123 THE CLIMATE REGISTRY, GENERAL REPORTING PROTOCOL 12 (May 2008),
available at http://www.theclimateregistry.org/downloads/GRP.pdf.
124 See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 51.100(s) (2008) (defining photochemical oxidants as a
broad range of substances); id. Pt. 51, App. W, 5.2.1 (requiring modeling of
photochemical oxidants and nitrogen dioxide to determine ozone impacts).
125 The Climate Registry, Board Directors, http://www.theclimateregistry.org/
memberlist.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2009).
126 Clean Air Act § 108, 42 U.S.C. § 7408 (2006).
127 Id. §108(a)(2).
128 Id. § 108(b).
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delay and might warrant developing an alternative federal
legislative model to speed the response to climate change. 29
However, as suggested by the ANPR, the EPA could readily adopt
the conclusions set forth in the Fourth Report of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 3 ° as air quality
criteria and air pollution control techniques.' State planning
processes, state legislators, and state and regional rulemaking
proceedings have relied on both this report and prior reports to
provide both the scientific basis for their planning processes and
information on techniques for limiting GHG emissions. 312
129 See Ronald P. Jackson, Jr., Extending the Success of the Acid Rain Provisions of
the Clean Air Act: An Analysis of the Clear Skies Initiative and Other Proposed
Legislative and Regulatory Schemes to Curb Multi-Pollutant Emissions From Fossil
Fueled Electric Generating Plants, 12 U. BALT. J. ENVT'L L. 91, 95-96, 99-103 (2005);
Michael Paul Pegman, The Ramifications of the W.H. Sammis Settlement: Why Jobs are
Being Lost, the Air Remains Unclean, and This Landmark Settlement is Making Progress
in the Wrong Direction, 31 WM. & MARY ENvT'L L. & POL'Y REv. 501, 526-27 (2007).
130 4T IPCC SUMMARY FOR POL'YMAKERS, supra note 7. Each report of the IPCC
reflects the latest scientific information on the identifiable and predicted impacts of
rising levels of GHGs on health and welfare. IPCC Reports are produced and peer
reviewed by hundreds of scientists nominated by the nations of the world. The IPCC
produces, at regular intervals, "comprehensive Assessment Reports of scientific,
technical and socio-economic information relevant for the understanding of human
induced climate change, potential impacts of climate change and options for mitigation
and adaptation." IPCC, Reports - Assessment Reports,
http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/index.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2009). The 41h 1PCC
Summary for Policy Makers, supra note 7, produced in 2007, contains four volumes,
including one synthesis report, one report on the scientific basis for assessing climate
change and its anthropogenic causes, one volume addressing impacts, adaptation and
vulnerability and one on climate mitigation, which describes air pollution control
techniques. The reports contain all of the information required by the Clean Air Act for
air quality criteria and air pollution control techniques for GHGs, and are updated at
regular intervals. Moreover, the reports have already been subject to public review and
comment. Given the quality and relevancy of the information, the participation of the
United States and scientists throughout the United States in the preparation and peer
review of these reports, and the opportunity for public review and comment, there
appears to be no valid reason that EPA could not adopt the 4,h JPCC Report as the initial
air quality criteria and information on air pollution control techniques for GHGs. There
is also no good reason for supposing that federal legislative action would be better
informed or could move more quickly in this regard.
131 ANPR, supra note 4, at 44483.
132 The various state plans and supporting documents can be accessed at The Center
for Climate Strategies, http://www.climatestrategies.us/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2009).
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B. What Type and Level of NAAQS is Appropriate for GHGs
Section 109(a)(1)(A) of the Clean Air Act'33 requires the EPA
to establish, simultaneously with the issuance of air quality criteria
and information on air pollution control techniques, "a national
primary . . . and a national secondary ambient air quality
standard"'34 for the pollutants. Secondary standards must specify
the concentration of the pollutant in the ambient atmosphere
"requisite to protect the public welfare from any known or
anticipated adverse effects associated with the presence of such air
pollutant in the ambient air."' 35 Primary standards must "allow an
adequate margin of safety" and be "requisite to protect the public
health."'
13 6
The nature of GHGs and their impacts make a secondary,
welfare-based NAAQS more appropriate.'37 Although climate
change can affect health, most of those health effects are
secondary impacts of welfare effects'38 rather than the types of
direct impacts associated with pollutants for which a primary
standard has been established in the past.'39 Physiologically,
humans, plants and animals can withstand much higher levels of
carbon dioxide and GHGs in the atmosphere than the levels that
will cause dangerous interference with the climate system. 4 °
133 Clean Air Act § 109(a)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 7409(a)(1)(A) (2006).
134 Id.
135 Id. § 109(b)(2).
136 Id. § 109(b)(1).
137 In the case of most other criteria pollutants, the EPA has established a health-
based primary standard and, unless there is a clear basis for a different welfare-based
standard, has set the secondary standard equal to the primary standard. Compare 40
C.F.R. §§ 50.6, 50.7, 50.9 (2008) (identical primary and secondary standards), with id
§§ 50.4-50.5 (differing primary and secondary standards for sulfur dioxide). In the case
of GHGs, EPA could either adopt a much higher primary standard based on health alone
or set the primary standard equal to the secondary standard. Id. § 50.2.
138 For example, some of the impacts of climate change on health are increased
mortality due to increased storminess or disease vectors moving north into areas that
were formerly free of the vector borne disease. 4T IPCC REPORT, supra note 94, at 48.
139 Effects such as lung diseases, cancer, and asthma led to the establishment of
health based primary standards. Clean Air Amendments of 1970: Hearings on H.R.
12934, H.R. 14960, H.R. 15137, and H.R. 15192 Before the Subcomm. on Public Health
and Welfare of the H. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 91st Cong. 6 (1969)
(statement of Jesse L. Steinfeld, Acting Surgeon General, Public Health Service).
140 See generally Jonathan L. Scott et al., Occupational Hazards of Carbon Dioxide
Exposure, J. CHEM. HEALTH & SAFETY (2009).
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Increased heat can directly cause stress leading to illness or death
under some circumstances in certain regions.141 However, the
increased heat will, at other times of the year and in other regions,
reduce the disease and death caused by cold. 142 Because both heat
and cold can cause stress,143 there is no reasonable basis for
establishing a health-based standard on the basis of temperature
alone. Severe adverse impacts on welfare will manifest
themselves long before temperatures rise to the point that would
support a health-based standard. As long as the EPA sets
secondary NAAQS at a level above current ambient levels and
requires emissions reductions as a part of a maintenance plan to
achieve a secondary standard, it will not make a great deal of
difference whether a primary standard is established.'44
To determine the criteria for setting a welfare-based standard,
the EPA should look to the standard established in the
UNFCCC. 145 There, the United States agreed to the goal of
stabilizing the concentration of GHGs in the ambient atmosphere
at a level that would "prevent dangerous anthropogenic
interference with the climate system."'146 That standard appears to
be the appropriate one for preventing "adverse effects" on public
welfare as that term is used in the Clean Air Act. 147
Although the Clean Air Act defines effects on "welfare" to
141 See, e.g., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE
2001: SYNTHEsis REPORT, SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 9, available at
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/climate-changes-200 1/synthesis-spm/synthesis-spm-en.pdf
[hereinafter 3RD IPCC SUMMARY FOR POL'YMAKERS]; Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, Extreme Cold: A Prevention Guide to Promote Your Personal Health and
Safety, http://www.bt.cdc.gov/disasters/winter/pdf/coldguide.pdf (last visited Feb. 10,
2009); Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Extreme Heat: A Prevention Guide
to Promote Your Personal Health and Safety, http://emergency.cdc.gov.disasters/
heat/heatguide.asp (last visited Feb. 10, 2009).
142 3RD IPCC SUMMARY FOR POL'YMAKERS, supra note 141, § Q3.17
143 Id.
144 Although most scientists and the IPCC suggest a target level of 450 to 550 ppmv
CO2e, James Hansen has suggested that a level of 350 ppmv may be required. Hansen et
al., supra note 7, at 206. If the target level is set such that the entire nation would be in
non-attainment, establishing a primary level would have significant ramifications. In
that case, it may be more appropriate to set the primary standard at a higher, truly health-
based level.
145 UNFCCC, supra note 6.
146 Id. at art. 2.
147 Clean Air Act § 108(a)(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(2)(C) (2006).
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include effects on "climate," '14 secondary standards must be
established at a level that will protect against "adverse effects" on
welfare, not "any effect" on welfare.149 Increased levels of GHGs
have both positive and negative effects. Indeed, increased levels
of GHGs will have likely offset the cooling impacts of acid
aerosols that induced Congress to include references to climate in
the definition of impacts on welfare. 5 ' Because of the mix of
beneficial and adverse impacts, the United States and other nations
decided in the UNFCCC that the world should seek to stabilize
GHG levels at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic
interference with the climate system.' 5' It is reasonable to adhere
to the international standard in deciding what level of GHGs in the
atmosphere will be deemed to cause "adverse effects"'5 on
welfare.
Scientists are still attempting to determine the concentration at
which GHG levels must be stabilized to prevent dangerous
anthropogenic interference with the climate system, and new
information develops daily. Most scientists are of the opinion that,
to prevent significant adverse impacts on welfare, carbon dioxide
levels need to be held at or below a 450 ppmv.'53 If the EPA
decides to hold levels of carbon dioxide to 450 ppmv, this would
require that concentrations of total GHGs be held below
148 Clean Air Act § 302(h).
149 This "any effect" standard has been erroneously cited in testimony opposing the
establishment of NAAQS. See Hearing on Massachusetts v. EPA Part 11: Implications
of the Supreme Court Decision Before the H. Select Comm. On Energy Independence
and Global Warming, I 10th Cong. (2008) (statement of David Bookbinder, Chief
Climate Counsel, Sierra Club), available at http://globalwarming.house.gov/tools/assets
/files/0429.pdf.
150 Thomas J. Crowley & William T. Hyde, Transient Nature of Late Pleistocene
Climate Variability, 456 NATURE 226, 228 (2008); James E. Hansen et al., Climate
Forcings in the Industrial Era, 95 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. Sci. U.S.A. 12753, 12757 (1998)
("it was probably the slowdown of fossil fuel growth rates in the last 25 years that
allowed greenhouse gas warming to dominate over aerosol cooling"); see also H.R. Rep.
No. 95-294, at 138 (1977), as reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1077, 1217.
151 UNFCCC, supra note 6, at art. 2.
152 Clean Air Act § 108(2)(C).
153 See Hansen et al., supra note 7, at 10. While the majority view looks to hold
total GHGs near 450 ppmv range, Dr. Hansen has recently suggested that a much lower
level of 350 ppmv may be the desirable level for carbon dioxide alone, which would
mean that the world is currently in non-attainment. Id.
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approximately 510 ppmv C0 2e. 154 These concentrations exceed
the current level of carbon dioxide and total GHGs in the ambient
atmosphere.
Regardless of the level at which the NAAQS should be
established, dramatic reductions of emissions will be required over
the next century in order to stabilize concentrations at or below the
NAAQS. The IPCC has estimated that worldwide emissions will
need to be reduced by 50 to 80% by the year 2050 in order to
stabilize climate at a level that will limit temperature increases to
20 C. 55 Because the United States has per capita emissions that
are roughly three times as great as the worldwide average, the
United States will need to reduce its emissions by 83 to 93% if a
per capita allocation is ultimately adopted. 
15 6
IV. In Light of the Unique Nature of Greenhouse Gases, SCIPs
Should Focus on Achieving the Emissions Reductions
Necessary to Achieve State-by-State GHG Emissions Caps
Based on the Fair Share of Emissions Reductions Required
to Maintain the NAAQS.
Section 10(a) of the Clean Air Act requires each state to
submit a plan that "provides for implementation, maintenance and
enforcement" of the NAAQS. 157 Because the NAAQS for GHGs
will likely be established at a level that exceeds current
atmospheric levels of those substances, 5 8 the SCIPs will need to
focus on achieving the emissions reductions necessary to maintain
atmospheric levels below the NAAQS. Regardless of whether
current levels of GHGs are higher or lower than the NAAQS, all
SCIPs will need to focus on achieving reductions of all GHG
emissions, and should have a different focus than SIPs directed to
other priority pollutants in the past.
154 4 TH IPCC REPORT, supra note 94, at 67, tbl.5.1.
155 4 TH IPCC SUMMARY FOR POL'YMAKERS, supra note 7, at 20, tbl.SPM.6.
156 See supra notes 7-8.
157 Clean Air Act § 1 10(a)(1).
158 ANPR, supra note 4, at 44367-68.
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A. The Unique Nature of GHGs and Global Contributions
Requires an Emissions- Reduction-Based Approach
Rather than One Focused on Local Concentrations and
Dispersion Modeling.
The unique nature of GHGs and the nature of the threats they
pose to welfare warrant a different focus for SCIPs than has been
the case for SIPs for previously regulated criteria pollutants. The
threats that GHG pollution poses to public welfare and health arise
from average global longer-term concentrations of GHGs, rather
than local ground-level concentrations or short-term variations in
those concentrations.'59 The danger that GHG emissions pose to
climate arises from the ability of global average concentrations of
GHGs to trap larger amounts of infrared radiation in the global
atmosphere over a long period of time. 6 ' Carbon dioxide and
other GHGs rapidly mix in the global atmosphere over a far
shorter period of time than that during which the climate system
will equilibrate. Moreover, the precise atmospheric levels of
carbon dioxide, the most common GHG, naturally vary between
summer and winter months. After GHGs have been emitted into
the atmosphere, they persist for long periods of time; thus,they
will accumulate and their average atmospheric concentrations will
increase. 6' For example, carbon dioxide has an average residence
time in the atmosphere of roughly 100 years, with some
percentage persisting far longer.'62 Thus, variations in local,
ground level concentrations of GHGs are irrelevant to the risks
causing a need to list GHGs as a priority pollutant.
Given these characteristics, SCIPs should focus on the long-
term reduction of total emissions to effect a long-term stabilization
of GHGs in the atmosphere and should not focus on temporary
variations of GHGs at the ground level. This will mean that SIPs
for GHGs, and the regulatory program generally, should not
require dispersion modeling or any determination of local levels of
159 See Tamara S. Ledley et al., Climate Change and Greenhouse Gases, 80 Eos.
TRANS. AMER. GEOPHYSICAL UNION 453 (1999), available at
http://ecosystems.wcp.muohio.edu/
studentresearch/climatechange02/kyoto/articles/greenhousegas.pdf.
160 Id.
161 Id. at 453.
162 See Hansen et al., supra note 7, at 226.
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GHGs at ground level.'63 Likewise, whether or not NAAQS are
exceeded locally should not be a concern. Measures to prevent
local, short-term exceeding of a GHG NAAQS will do nothing to
prevent the harm to welfare (or health) that the NAAQS are
intended to address. Only changes in global concentrations of
GHGs will cause such an impact. This is a significantly different
focus than has been required for the SIPs for other criteria
pollutants, where the need to protect health requires modeling to
assure that health based standards are not exceeded at ground level
wherever people could be exposed to the pollutant."64
Accordingly, new regulations tailoring the requirements of the
Clean Air Act to these characteristics of the pollutant being
regulated will be needed. The regulations should specify that
SCIPs focus on achieving long-term reductions in emissions that
will put the United States on a path towards achieving its share of
reductions necessary to stabilize GHG levels in the atmosphere at
or below the NAAQS-they should be maintenance SIPs.
Specifically, they should focus upon achieving the required
emissions reductions that will likely be required of the United
States based on its "common but differentiated responsibilit[y]"
under the UNFCCC.'65 This would mean that the mix of
regulatory options to be developed by the states in their SCIPs
should aim to achieve phased emissions reductions consistent with
long-term emissions reduction goals necessary to keep global
concentrations of all GHGs at or below the NAAQS.
163 Section 1 10(a)(2)(K) of the Clean Air Act requires only that plans require "such
air quality modeling as the Administrator may prescribe for the purpose of predicting the
effect on ambient air quality of any emissions of any air pollutant for which the
Administrator has established a national ambient air quality standard." Clean Air Act §
110(a)(2)(K), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(K) (2006). Given the nature of GHG emissions
and their impacts, the Administrator could elect to prescribe no modeling for individual
state plans and individual sources and prescribe reliance upon modeling done by the
IPCC for the purpose of determining overall numeric emissions reductions required.
164 See 40 C.F.R. § 51.115 (2008).
165 UNFCCC, supra note 6, at art. 3, 1.
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B. The State by State Emissions Reductions Should be Based
Upon a "No Regrets " Emission Reduction Goal for the
United States Distributed Among the States.
Although the nature of GHGs and the dangers they pose
suggest that modeling and short-term ground level concentrations
are irrelevant, this does not answer the question of what emissions
reductions should be required. Even if the United States
eliminated all emissions of GHGs, it would not achieve the
reductions necessary to stabilize concentrations below the
NAAQS. Thus, a specific emissions reduction goal for the United
States must be determined. This plan must include reduction
allocation among the states, as well as a timeline for such
reductions. This decision can be guided by science, international
law and the experience of the states in developing climate action
plans.
To determine the national emissions reduction goal, the EPA
can look to science and international law. According to the IPCC,
world GHG emissions will need to be reduced by 50 to 80% by
2050 to limit temperature increases to 20C, and if world emissions
are allocated on a per capita basis, the United States would need to
reduce emissions by 83 to 96%.166 The UNFCCC provides that the
nations of the world have a "common but differentiated
responsibility"' 67 to maintain global GHG levels below the level
that would cause "dangerous" interference with the climate system
- viz. the NAAQS.168 Where pollution originates outside of the
United States, the Clean Air Act specifically authorizes the
approval of SIPs where the "implementation plan of such State
would be adequate to ... maintain the relevant national ambient
air quality standards ... but for emissions emanating from outside
of the United States.' ' 169  Therefore, in order to determine the
emissions reduction goal for the United States in light of foreign
emissions, the EPA should start with a "no regrets" policy of
emissions reductions that will be required of the United States
under any future international scenario but in a time frame that
166 See supra text accompanying notes 6-7.
167 UNFCCC, supra note 6, at art. 3.1.
168 Id. at art. 2.
169 Clean Air Act § 179B(a)(2). An implementation plan must also meet the
requirements set forth in the Clean Air Act, with the exception of showing attainment or
maintenance by the attainment date. Id.
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would allow the United States to achieve those reductions under
the most likely alternative scenario, as discussed further below.
For the purpose of determining the emissions reductions that
would be required nationally, the EPA can consider the experience
of the states that have adopted a similar approach. These states
have adopted the goal of reducing emissions levels by eighty
percent from 1990 levels by the year 2050, with consistent
intermediate goals for 2020 or 2025.17° There is general
agreement that worldwide emissions of GHGs will need to be
reduced by eighty percent from 1990 levels by the year 2100,
perhaps even by 2050, in order to stabilize atmospheric levels near
a 450 ppmv CO2e range.1 71  Internationally, there has been a
dispute as to whether reduction obligations should be based on pro
rata reductions (equal percentage reductions for all), reductions
necessary to provide for equal per capita reductions, or programs
under which developed nations responsible for past buildup of
carbon dioxide emissions reduce their emissions beyond their per
capita share to account for past disparities in emissions. If a per
capita allocation is adopted the United States would need to reduce
emissions by an additional two-thirds and under the third
distribution scenario even further. Achieving the minimum eighty
percent pro rata reduction that will be required of the United States
by mid-century would put the United States on a path that will
allow it to achieve the reductions necessary by the end of the
century under the other two allocation scenarios.
While a 2050 goal is useful for identifying the ultimate
emissions reduction goal, it is well beyond a useful planning
timeline. Initial goals for recent state climate plans have therefore
focused on reductions required by 2020 or 2025. States have
found that a ten to fifteen year planning horizon will be necessary
for implementation, since uncertainties regarding effectiveness of
170 These intermediate goals have generally represented the goals of the various
state climate plans, which are summarized in Appendix 1. These goals have varied, in
part due to the varying growth rates of the states, but generally at least require reductions
of emissions to levels at or ten percent below 1990 or 2000 levels by 2020. See infra
app. I.
171 See, e.g., Governor of Florida Exec. Order No. 07-127, available at
http://www.flclimatechange.us/ewebeditpro/items/O12F15074.pdf (setting reduction
target of eighty percent by 2100). The IPCC suggests that worldwide emissions will
need to be reduced between fifty and eighty percent by 2050 to stabilize emissions. See
supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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selected measures and changes in technologies will require plan
revisions and enable more ambitious goals to be achieved cost
effectively in later years. While the Clean Air Act generally
requires that actions take place within a certain number of years
after a trigger rather than a specific year,'72 establishing
nationwide emissions reduction goals necessary to stabilize GHG
concentrations at or below the NAAQS will require the
establishment of firm goals with specific dates.'73
The EPA could utilize existing state and federal GHG
inventories and forecasts to determine actual and state-by-state
emissions reductions necessary to achieve the required national
emissions reduction goals and develop a strategy under the Clean
Air Act to meet the goals by a mix of federal and state efforts.
This mix would include categorical federal emissions standards
under sections 111, 202, 213, and 231 of the Clean Air Act for
new sources, 174 and state climate plans that will select a portfolio
of actions appropriate for each state, including sectoral cap-and-
trade programs which may be adopted by states under section
1 10(a)(2)(A) of the Clean Air Act 175 for the sectors that each state
determines could most readily take advantage of a cap-and-trade
program.
The EPA could allocate the national emissions caps among the
states based on their current emissions, adjusted by population
projections. The EPA could also calculate expected emissions
reductions from categorical standards which it expects to establish.
SIPs could then be required to designate the mix of measures
calculated to achieve the additional reductions beyond EPA
categorical standards required of each state in order to meet the
state's reduction goal. Thirty-one states have already started or
successfully completed plans using this methodology, and
developed portfolios of proposed measures that can cost
effectively reduce emissions to meet goals consistent with the
172 See, e.g., Clean Air Act § 172 (calling for attainment of primary standards within
five years of designation of an area as non-attainment).
173 Requirements in the Clean Air Act for updating SIPs are still appropriate under
this formulation, since reassessment will be required as new information becomes
available (including information on the efficacy of the selected GHG emissions
reduction measures initially selected in a state's SCIP).
174 Clean Air Act §§ 111,202, 213,231.
175 Id. § 1 10(a)(2)(A).
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minimum eighty percent pro rata reduction required of the United
States by mid-century.
76
C. A Workable Structure for State Climate Implementation
Plans Including an Effective Cap-and-Trade Mechanism
Can Be Implemented Under Existing Clean Air Act
Authority.
Planning represents a tool that can be used to help coordinate
the many diverse laws and measures required to achieve the
emissions reductions necessary to satisfy the "no-regrets" GHG
emissions reductions required of the United States. 77 State plans
are particularly appropriate given differences among the states in
land use law, transportation law, utility law, municipal law, and
finance law, as well as differences in climate and resources. The
state implementation planning mechanism can be adapted and
used to craft a state-by-state approach that will not only provide a
workable program for addressing the problem of climate change,
but will produce the most cost effective mix of mechanisms for
addressing the issue across all economic sectors.
The current regulations governing the content of SIPS and the
procedures for their development are ill suited to the development
of plans for GHG emissions reductions as described here. 178 To
best realize the advantages, new regulations will be needed for
SCIPs. At a minimum, these would need to specify the emissions
reductions required for each state and direct that an SCIP
designate the mix of measures appropriate for the state that can
achieve the emissions reductions necessary to meet the goals by
the initial intermediate deadline. 179 The plans could include any
mix of measures that EPA and the state determine are appropriate,
but the regulations could describe the types of measures to be
included. A successful plan would need to include: methods to
reduce demand for electricity sufficient to facilitate reduction of
emissions reductions in the utility industry; methods to reduce
176 See supra text accompanying note 74.
177 See supra notes 27-28.
178 40 C.F.R. pt. 51 (2008). The current regulations focus on modeling, new source
review, and designation of implementing regulations and laws. Id.
179 As noted above, this would be established as a 2020 or 2025 emissions reduction
goal. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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emissions in areas where categorical federal standards might not
apply, such as land use and transportation use, agriculture, forestry
and waste, heating and cooling in residential and commercial
buildings, and building codes; methods to facilitate
implementation of GHG reduction measures such as financing
techniques and other incentives; any emissions limitations more
stringent than the federal program; methods to implement a cap-
and-trade program, including which sectors would be covered for
the state, number of allowances that will be provided, and methods
of allocating the distribution of emissions allowances; and
methods to implement the EPA's categorical standards. These
plans should not require air quality modeling or any analysis of
local air quality impacts (which are irrelevant to GHGs), but
would need to examine cost effectiveness and potential emissions
reductions from the recommended measures.
The regulations could also specify other procedures and
criteria that have made state climate planning processes
successful. To make the plans most effective, the SCIP
regulations could require that SCIPs be developed with the broad
stakeholder input provided in the current state climate planning
processes. For example, state climate plans have typically been
developed by stakeholders and technical working groups (TWGs),
which assess, develop and evaluate GHG reduction measures in
the relevant socio-economic sectors: energy supply (ES);
transportation and land use (TLU); residential, commercial and
industrial facilities and processes (RCI); agriculture, forestry and
waste (AFW); and cross-cutting strategies. The state processes
have engaged stakeholders from the relevant technical areas and
interest groups in a stepwise process for developing and evaluating
reduction options. In the twenty state plans used for scale up
analysis in this article, 1,200 stakeholders and TWG members
were involved in selecting, designing and analyzing roughly 900
specific policy recommendations combined. These intensive
technical collaboration processes identify, from a list of over 350
policy options, those most appropriate for the TWG and the state,
and make those options priorities for analysis. The priorities are
analyzed for GHG reduction potential, cost-effectiveness, co-
benefits, feasibility and other criteria, and are either retained or
rejected for further analysis. Regulations for SCIPs could direct
that state processes consider reductions in all of these areas and
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include measures to assure that stakeholder input is provided in the
formulation and analysis of options. The traditional notice and
comment approach to public participation will not generate the
quality of information that early engagement in a planning process
provides.
The regulations should also provide for a modified two phase
plan development and submission process. Because measures for
GHG emissions reductions span all areas of the economy,
California found that a two phase planning process was useful for
the design and implementation of its economy-wide program,
developing a conceptual plan followed by specific regulations.
180
Other state planning processes began similarly. An analogous
approach would be useful for SCIP development and approval.
Under this approach, in the first phase, a state would adopt and
submit to EPA for approval a conceptual plan outlining the
portfolio of proposed GHG reduction measures, the cumulative
emissions reductions that they would achieve, their projected costs
(positive or negative), and feasibility. In the second phase, the
state would submit the actual implementation mechanisms (laws
and regulations, including methods for implementing any cap-and-
trade system and allocating emissions allowances). Upon
submission of individual implementation measures consistent with
the conceptual plan, the measures would become part of the SIP
and federally enforceable. 181
Cap-and-trade and other market-based programs will, in most
cases, be a part of the mix of measures that will be selected to
achieve a state's required emissions reduction. Cap-and-trade and
other market-based programs may be made a part of an SIP under
the express authority of section 1 0(a)(2)(A) of the Clean Air Act.
182 Virtually all of the states that have adopted state climate plans
have included cap-and-trade and other market-based mechanisms
as part of those plans. Many of the states that have developed
climate plans are also participating in regional cap-and-trade
programs. EPA can utilize the section 1 10 planning process and
180 See CAL. AIR RESOURCES BOARD, CLIMATE CHANGE PROPOSED SCOPING PLAN 1
(2008), available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/scopingplan/document/psp.pdf (adopted
pursuant to the California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE §§ 38500-38599).
181 See Clean Air Act §§ 113,304.
182 Id. § 1 l0(a)(2)(A).
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its approval authority to coordinate these market mechanisms into
a national cap-and-trade program.
Regulations setting forth minimum performance criteria for a
cap-and-trade system that could be approved by the EPA as a part
of an SCIP under section 1 10(a)(2)(A) of the Clean Air Act'83
would also be necessary to assure that state cap-and-trade
programs are integrated into a national program. In defining the
performance criteria for a federal cap-and-trade program, these
regulations should define the type of system that the EPA would
impose in a federal implementation plan should it be required to
promulgate one, including the method by which the EPA would
allocate emissions allowances to sources within the state covered
by the FIP cap-and-trade program.
Upon approval of a state's SCIP with a cap-and-trade strategy
that will achieve all the required reductions required for the state
(through both other measures and the cap-and-trade) or
promulgation of a FIP with a cap-and-trade program, the credits
that would be created and allocated by the state would become
federal credits that could be traded among all states with SCIP-
approved cap-and-trade programs. If a state chose to allocate by
auction, the credits created could be auctioned in a single federal
auction, as is done under the RGGI program and is contemplated
for the WCI program. To account for the fact that electricity is
traded across state lines, it will be necessary to require that states
achieve reductions on the basis of both Type 2 (demand based)
and Type 1 (direct) emissions.'84 State plans have developed
mechanisms to avoid "leakage," or, in this case, the transfer of
emissions to an out-of-state source; requiring reductions on both
bases will avoid these problems.
In developing a cap-and-trade program, it is important to
maintain flexibility so that existing programs can be retained and
incorporated into a federal program and so that states can select
the most appropriate mix of market and non-market mechanisms
in light of each state's legal structure. The performance criteria
could achieve this by allowing automatic approval of existing
183 Id.
184 See THE CLIMATE REGISTRY, GENERAL REPORTING PROTOCOL FOR THE
VOLUNTARY REPORTING SYSTEM § 5.1 (2008), available at
http://www.theclimateregistry.org/downloads/GRP.pdf.
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programs, including the WCI and RGGI regional cap-and-trade
programs.'85 Efficiency could be assured if the program allowed
the states flexibility to decide what elements of their GHG
emissions reduction programs should be satisfied by a cap-and-
trade program. The EPA would only approve a SCIP if the
combination of the cap-and-trade program and other measures
specified by the SCIP were calculated to achieve the cumulative
reductions required for that state. However, after the EPA has
approved a program defining how credits could be used within the
state and how many credits would be generated and allocated by
the state, credits could be freely bought and used throughout the
national system. This flexibility would likely produce a more cost
effective GHG emission reduction program than would a one-size-
fits-all program, since differences in state legal systems and
differences in where emissions reductions can be achieved often
will require different mixes of cap-and-trade and other
measures. 1
86
This approach, which leaves considerable flexibility to the
states, has several advantages over alternative mechanisms
discussed in the ANPR. First, it provides a mechanism consistent
with the statutory authority provided currently under the Clean Air
Act. As noted, section 110 of the Clean Air Act specifically
allows SIPs to include market mechanisms, and such mechanisms
have successfully been used to address NOx reductions in the past.
Although the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia invalidated a federally created cap-and-trade system for
other criteria pollutants established by the CAIR in North
Carolina v. Environmental Protection Agency,'87 this case is
distinguishable because of the context in which the decision arose
and the differences between GHGs and the pollutants at issue in
N.C. v. EPA. The CAIR was adopted to address instances where
interstate transport from one state to another interfered with
attainment of NAAQS in the second state.' The court focused on
the fact that with a cap-and-trade program, there can be no
assurances that emissions from individual sources in one state
185 Rose et al., supra note 91.
186 See, e.g., LITZ & ZYLA, supra note 79.
187 N.C. v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
188 Id. at 903.
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would not cause violations of local, ground-level NAAQS or
interfere with maintenance of those local, ground-level
concentrations in another state.'89 As noted, local, ground level
concentrations of GHGs are irrelevant to the atmospheric standard
for GHGs.' 9° The harm to public welfare from GHG pollution
does not arise from local and temporary exceeding of a GHG
concentration, but from GHGs exceeding the NAAQS throughout
the atmosphere after long-term mixing.' 9' Moreover, because the
SCIPs would be designed to reduce emissions to levels required of
the United States for maintenance of NAAQS set at a
concentration above current atmospheric levels, a cap-and-trade
program represents a logical and legal mechanism to maintain
overall levels below the NAAQS in the long run. These
differences would support the establishment of a national
maintenance plan based on emissions loadings, would support the
establishment of a cap-and-trade program as a mechanism to
maintain levels below the NAAQS, and make the CAIR Decision
distinguishable from the case at hand.'92
Second, establishment of a cap-and-trade program as an SIP
element will allow a wider and more effective use of market-based
mechanisms than the alternative approach under section 111 (d) of
the Clean Air Act'93 and would be more consistent with the law.
The EPA and some non-governmental organizations have
suggested that establishing a cap-and-trade program under section
1 11(d) would be preferable to utilizing the section 110
mechanism. This approach suffers first from the infirmity that it is
inconsistent with the statute. As noted, the EPA is legally required
to list GHGs under section 108 of the Clean Air Act and therefore,
the EPA cannot proceed under section 11 (d).'94 Second, section
111 (d) will limit the use of cap-and-trade to stationary sources,
which represent only a fraction of the important GHG emissions.
Significant emissions of GHGs arise from residential, commercial,
and industrial space heating, as well as from mobile sources, the
189 Id. at 907.
190 See supra text accompanying note 77.
191 Id.
192 Id.
193 Clean Air Act § 111 (d), 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (d) (2006).
194 See supra notes 107, 118 and accompanying text.
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inclusion of which in a cap-and-trade program developed under
section 111(d) may be problematic. The WCI has sought to
include these sources in phase two of its cap-and-trade program by
imposing requirements upstream, at the point of sale of fuel
products,'95 but that approach would not be authorized under
section 111 (d).'96 A section 111 (d) approach suffers from the third
infirmity in that it could not be supported by the other state
planning measures that will make a cap-and-trade approach most
effective.
Third, since the RGGI cap-and-trade program is already in
place, and the WCI cap-and-trade program has already been
designed, with implementation and reporting scheduled to begin in
2011,'9' applying cap-and-trade through the section 110
mechanism will provide fast results.
Fourth, preserving these existing programs will allow states to
continue to generate revenues from the auctions of allowances.
These revenues are being used to fund other programs that will
reduce GHG emissions, assist with adaptation or mitigate adverse
impacts of regulation or climate change.
The mechanism suggested here is similar to that which the
European Union has adopted in which member nations are
assigned emissions reduction caps and the emissions attributable
to the sources that each state decides will be covered by cap-and-
trade are included in a trading program.'98 The European cap-and-
trade program supports a robust emissions trading program on the
European Climate exchange,' 99 and many of the European nations
will achieve their Kyoto Protocol emissions reduction targets
under this system.200  The system suggested here, with EPA
oversight and the ability to approve and disapprove state climate
195 WESTERN CLIMATE INITIATIVE, DESIGN RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE WCI
REGIONAL CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM 22 (2008), available at
http://www.westemclimateinitiative.org/ewebeditpro/ items/O I 04F I 9865.PDF.
196 Clean Air Act § 111(d).
197 Western Climate Initiative, supra note 195, at 43.
198 See supra note 80.
199 See European Climate Exchange, http://www.europeanclimateexchange.con
default flash.asp (last visited Mar. 26, 2009).
200 See UNFCCC, National Reports, http://uncfccc.int/national-reports/items/1408.
php (last visited Mar. 26, 2009) (collecting the National Reports documenting progress
in meeting Kyoto Protocol emissions reduction targets).
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plans and impose an FIP, will provide greater coordination than
the EU system.
As discussed further in the next section, allowing states to
select the range of measures that is most appropriate, including the
areas to be addressed by market and non-market mechanisms, will
promote economic efficiency by allowing selection of least-cost
mechanisms.
With the foregoing structure, the EPA could modify the
existing NAAQS and SIP mechanism provided by sections 108
through 110 of the Clean Air Act to make it fully workable for
achieving GHG emissions reductions in a flexible and cost
effective manner.2"1 The effectiveness of the procedures described
here has been established through numerous state climate planning
processes, and the program is similar to those that have been
effective for EU nations.
V. Allowing States to Select the Mix of Measures and Policy
Instruments to Achieve Reductions Will Produce the Most
Cost-Effective Approach to GHG Emissions Reduction.
Relying on state plans to specify a mix of measures will
promote the most economically efficient approach to achieving
necessary GHG emissions reductions and can assist in promoting
economic recovery and development. Each state has important
differences in climate, resources, industry mix, transportation and
legal structures for local governments, public finance, and utility
regulation. Because of these differences among the states,
individualized consideration of the mix of GHG emissions
reduction measures, strategies and market and non-market
201 There may be concerns about the speed with which this system could be
established. In developing SCIP-specific regulations, the EPA could introduce new
measures that would allow it to take full advantage of the expertise that has been
developed by the state experience. Many states have used third party organizations such
as the Center for Climate Strategies to provide expert facilitation. See The Ctr. for
Climate Strategies, http://www.climatestrategies.us/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2009). The
EPA could certify these organizations and then provide for expedited approval of the
phase one conceptual plans, where these organizations certify that the appropriate
procedures have been followed, the required analyses have been performed, and the
measures designated in the plan will achieve or exceed the reductions required for the
state. The EPA could then approve state conceptual plans based on these third party
certifications.
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approaches appropriate for each state will produce a more cost-
effective approach than a federal one-size-fits-all approach.
The benefit of a comprehensive federal system that coordinates
and incorporates individual plans is evident from consideration of
two studies that we and others have conducted for the Center for
Climate Strategies and will present here. First, we have developed
cost-effectiveness curves for the individualized climate plans that
have been developed by twenty states, and have scaled those
experiences up to demonstrate the GHG emissions reduction that
could be achieved if this planning process were implemented in all
fifty states, including the cost-effectiveness of those reductions.
Second, we have analyzed the individual policies developed by
states for their potential for economic development and
implementation by state, local and federal levels of government.
The latter study makes it clear that significant state and local
involvement is critical to the success of a cost-effective program
for GHG emissions reductions in the United States.
A. Scale-up of Twenty State Plans and Cost-Effectiveness
Analysis.
Relying on the latest data available from the twenty states that
have completed quantified climate plans and associated policy
portfolios, we have constructed a model that scales up and projects
their combined economic impacts and opportunities to a national
level. The preliminary analysis, summarized here and presented in
detail in the appendix, suggests that by adopting a portfolio of
climate change mitigation policies touching every sector of the
economy, the United States can stimulate the economy toward
recovery, cut consumption of fossil fuels, and reduce GHG
emissions simultaneously. The quantified result is graphically
represented by the following "marginal cost curve."2 2 This curve
suggests that if portfolios of similar policies were developed by all
202 The cost curve has been constructed from a series of line segments joined
together. Each line segment that has been plotted refers to a specific recommended
policy action (from a state climate plan) defined by two attributes. First, the length of
each line segment is determined by the GHG emission reduction potential of the related
policy option (the longer the line segment, the greater the emission reduction). Second,
the cost curve shows the potential net cost or savings associated with each policy
measure. If the policy measure saves money on a net basis, its line segment finds its
place below the "0" line. If it costs money or requires investment on a net basis, it finds
its place as a line segment above the "0" line.
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fifty states with coordination by the federal government, the
United States could reduce GHG emissions to 10% below 1990
levels by 2020 at an estimated net economic savings of $20.8
billion in 2012 and $85 billion in 2020, and from 2009 to 2020
cumulative net savings of $535.5 billion, through implementing a
climate plan involving all states and economic sectors. These
results do not include additional economic benefits associated with
avoidance of climate change damages: improvement in health or
air quality, land protection, creation of jobs, local community
investment, improved energy independence, or other co-benefits.
Figure 1. Stepwise Marginal Cost Curves for the U.S., 2020203
This portfolio of climate policies 24 selected by each state
returns greater savings (area below "0") than it expends in costs
(area above "0") and, if fully implemented at an equivalent level in
all fifty states, would reduce emissions to 10% below 1990 levels
203 AFW=agriculture, forestry, and waste management; ES=energy supply; RCI=
residential, commercial, and industrial; and TLU=transportation and land use.
204 An example list of the policy measures for the state of Florida included in the
cost curve can be found in the detailed analysis in Appendix I.
Economy-wide Stepwise Marginal Cost Curve of US, 2020
(Center for Climate Strategies, 2008)
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by 2020.205
A growing body of related economic analysis indicates that
these climate policies could have a significant and beneficial effect
on job creation and overall economic development. 2 6  Two
important forces are at play. First, actions that reduce energy
demand and/or infrastructure expenses save money at a business,
household, and consumer level. By freeing up scarce capital for
other uses, these actions have an expansionary effect on the
economy. In many cases, they also have an economic stimulus
effect through investment in labor-intensive installation of new
energy efficient equipment, buildings and facilities. Second,
actions that shift energy supply away from conventional fossil fuel
sources to renewable and alternative sources typically result in
proportionately higher use of labor per unit of energy produced.
The higher cost of production for some of these options also
results in more highly leveraged investments in job creation. This
is even more pronounced when new domestic energy supplies
replace imported energy.
To examine the potential impact on economic development,
our scale-up analysis also analyzed 900 policies from the twenty
states and grouped them into eighty bundles of similar policies.2"7
This analysis revealed that these policies could be powerful
economic drivers while providing significant progress in reducing
GHG emissions. Forty-four of the bundles, more than half, could
move funding into the economy within a one year period and thus
205 It is worth noting that the assumptions behind the state climate plans are
conservative and have been overtaken by recent events. We are in the process of
revising this analysis by inserting into the model higher fuel prices more reflective of
current market conditions. It is safe to assume that this would increase the savings side
of the cost curve, as the value of energy efficiency gains would be even greater than they
already are. We are also revising estimates of projected greenhouse gas emissions levels
to take the economic slowdown into account. Since emissions will rise at a slower rate,
the impact of reductions as a percentage of the total carbon footprint will likely be more
significant. In short, we expect the new analysis to point to the potential for even steeper
emissions reductions and even greater net economic benefit. In addition, some important
emissions reduction actions in state plans do not provide numerical estimates of costs but
were expected to provide net savings or low costs. These actions are not included in the
current cost curve and would expand its coverage and reduce its overall costs.
206 Many state governments have taken action on climate change as an economic
development tool. See supra note 14.
207 See CTR. FOR CLIMATE STRATEGIES, POL'Y & PROGRAM OPPORTUNITIES, supra
note 15 passim.
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could be used for immediate economic stimulus. Sixty-eight of
the policy bundles, or roughly eighty-five percent, had high to
moderate job creation potential. Ten of these policies had the
capability of producing three million tons or more of CO2e
emissions reduction.2 °8
B. Economic Development Benefits from State Climate
Change Plans-North Carolina and Arizona.
The results of state climate action plans show that economic
development benefits can result from specific sector-based
policies and measures for these reasons, and others. This is
exemplified by detailed analysis of the results of the planning
processes in North Carolina and Arizona.
In 2008, the North Carolina Climate Action Plan Advisory
Group proposed fifty-six comprehensive climate mitigation action
recommendations in all economic sectors, which are estimated to
reduce GHG emissions in North Carolina to within 1% of 1990
levels by 2020.209 An economic analysis of thirty-five quantified
recommendations revealed that they will yield a net savings of
over $5 billion (net present value over 2007-2020); create more
than 15,000 jobs, generate $565 million in employee and
proprietor income, and increase $302 million in gross state product
by 2020; generate more than $2.2 billion in net additional
employee and proprietor income, and more than $1.2 billion (net
present value) in net gross state product over the 2007 to 2020
period. 210
These figures represent net impacts. There are sectors and
individual companies that will incur increased costs and decreased
jobs. These losses and costs will be more than offset by gains by
other companies, individuals, and sectors. The state-by-state
planning approach can minimize some of these impacts by
selecting the most cost effective measures by sector and can also
identify mitigating measures.
208 Id.
209 N.C. CLIMATE ACTION PLAN ADVISORY GROUP, RECOMMENDED MITIGATION
OPTIONS FOR CONTROLLING GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS (2008), available at
http://www.ncclimatechange.us/capag.cfim.
210 DAVID PONDER, JEFFERY TILLER & JASON HOYLE, SECONDARY ECONOMIC IMPACT
ANALYSIS OF GREENHOUSE GAS MITIGATION OPTIONS FOR NORTH CAROLINA 3-4 (Oct.
2008), available at http://www.ncclimatechange.us/ewebeditpro/items/O 120F 19986.pdf.
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These points can be exemplified by consideration of two North
Carolina examples: the portfolio of policies selected in that state's
planning process for the residential, commercial and industrial
(RCI) sector, and one specific option that was recommended by
the North Carolina climate action plan.
Table 1 presents summary results for the RCI mitigation
options analyzed in the North Carolina climate action plan. By
2020, these options would result in the net creation of more than
9,100 jobs, $364 million in additional employee and proprietor
income, and $42 million in net gross state product. Over the study
period, 2007-2020, the options would generate $1.9 billion (net
present value) in additional employee and proprietor income and
$937 million (net present value) in gross state product. The
economic impacts associated with these options are driven
primarily by energy bill savings resulting from energy efficiency
measures.
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Table 1: Summary Results for North Carolina Residential,
Commercial and Industrial Climate Mitigation Policy
Options21
Net Annual Net Income Total Value-Added
Employment (FTE) ($2004, million) ($2004, million)
Residential,
Commercial 2007- 2007-
and Industrial 2010 2015 2020 2010 2015 2020 2020 2010 2015 2020 2020
Options NPV NPV
RCI 1,2 & II
(Efficiency
1,309 3,121 4,575 45 105 160 789 18 (4) (55) 36
Funding &
Energy Audits)
RCI 4&5
(Market
Transformatio 430 771 15 87 1 (11) (9)
n & Appliance
Standards)
RCI 6 (Energy 1,964 2,076 2,163 83 86 623 96 77 57 571
Codes)
RCI 7 & 3
(High
126 1,239 1,372 3 61 388 (5) 46 32 273
Performance
Buildings)
RCI 9 (Bulk
OPurchasing
105 99 12 4 4 (1) 33 5 3 (5)
& Green
Power)
RCI 10
(Solar Water 13 (4) 218 1 0 13 21 0 1 24 37
Heating)
All RCI
3,518 6,961 9,110 136 271 364 1,942 114 125 42 937Policies
The results in Table 1 indicate that actions related to energy
211 Id. at 22. "Values in parentheses identify loss ofjobs, income, or [v]alue [a]dded
to the economy. NPV = net present value. FTE=Full Time Equivalent." Id
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efficiency and conservation for buildings, facilities, and
manufacturing in North Carolina generate net gains in
employment, income, and investment. These actions also yield
some of the highest GHG reductions in the state plan. This
category of actions has a high potential for saving money by
saving energy, starting immediately, and for freeing up scarce
capital for investment that has an economic stimulus effect.
Figure 2 demonstrates this graphically for income effects. All
state climate action plans have found that energy efficiency and
conservation measures have a high potential for net economic
savings and greenhouse gas reduction. Results from North
Carolina suggest that they may have broader economic benefits as
well.
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
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Figure 2. Net Income Gains from North Carolina
Residential, Commercial and Industrial Climate Mitigation
Policy Options...
These points are also evident from consideration of the
cellulosic ethanol production subsidy recommended in the North
Carolina climate action plan. This recommended policy proposes
to displace ten percent of North Carolina's gasoline consumption
with starch and cellulosic derived ethanol by 2010, and to increase
that percentage to twenty-five percent by 2025. The option
assumes a state subsidy to support ethanol producers worth $0.23
per gallon through 2015, at which time the plan assumes that
technological advances will make cellulosic ethanol production
213costs more competitive.
The Agriculture, Forestry and Waste (AFW) technical working
group analysis that produced this recommendation quantified the
cost of the subsidy, but not the value of the capital investments
and operating expenses, including feed stocks, required to meet
the production targets. In this study, we have relied on additional
212 Id. Numbers refer to specific options in this sector from the North Carolina
climate action plan.
213 N.C. CLIMATE ACTION PLAN ADVISORY GROUP, supra note 209, at 5-11 to 5-12,
6-11.
Net Income Impact of Residenti al, Commercial & Industrial Opt! ons
($2004, millions)
400
350 _
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investments research and literature to quantify these values. When
all these factors are considered, this mitigation option would result
in the creation of more than 2,781 jobs, $163 million in additional
annual employee and proprietor income, and more than $298
million in annual gross state product by 2020. For the study
period 2007-2020, the mitigation option would increase employee
and proprietor income by $547 million (NPV) and gross state
product by more than $1.2 billion (NPV). Figure 3 below shows
the high job creation potential for this climate policy option (the
solid purple line) in absolute terms as well as compared to other
actions in the agriculture, forestry and waste management sectors.
Figure 3. Net Employment Gains from Actions to Expand
In-State Cellulosic Ethanol Supplies in North Carolina
2 14
Net Employment Impact of
Agriculture, Forestry& Waste Opti ons
(FullTime Equivalents)
ZOO). -1009 14 1r 01s_71-09
. AW-N AFW4b -MA.6 -AW-
-W-Il -AW-3 --- AUAWOU a-FW-g AMW -SWZI
214 AFW=agriculture, forestry and waste management. Numbers refer to specific
options in this sector from the North Carolina climate action plan.
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Follow-up studies of the recommendations of the Arizona
Climate Change Advisory Group estimated a cumulative net
increase in employment associated with new clean and renewable
energy supply options of 289,000 jobs by 2020. 215 In addition,
policies that have the potential to save money by saving energy
and infrastructure expenses are likely to have an expansionary
effect on the economy by freeing up scarce capital for other uses.
C. Sectoral Contributions to GHG Emissions Reductions.
The scale-up of state data also shows that all contributions
from all sectors will be required to achieve cost-effective
reductions. One of the strengths of state planning is its ability to
achieve reductions in all sectors, while, as discussed below,
federal power may be somewhat more limited. The data from the
states on a sector-by-sector basis, as shown in Figure 4, provides
the estimated scale and trajectory of actions in each sector.
Figure 4. United States GHG Reductions by Sector 2009-
2020
Economy-wide Gieenhous* Gas Reducohn Potental of United States
(Includes Resent and Planned Actions)C, enter for Clh mate Stratse ies, 20
000
5000
710
400
2o0O
0
990 19D5 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020
215 Adam Rose & Dan Wei, Economic Impacts of Climate Policies in Arizona,
2006-2020, prepared for the Center for Climate Strategies as a supplement to the Arizona
Climate Change Advisory Group Report, (Aug. 2006).
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MMtCO 2e=million metric ton carbon dioxide equivalent
As the "wedge" graph shows, implementation of climate
policy options could begin immediately and provide near term
economic benefits (jobs, income, investment) as programs expand
to full levels in later years. Climate change mitigation options in
this analysis are grouped into one of four sector areas:
1. Transportation and Land Use (vehicle efficiency, location
efficiency, and lower carbon fuels);
2. Agriculture, Forestry and Waste (land conservation,
improved management practices, waste reduction and
recycling);
3. Residential, Commercial and Industrial (energy efficiency
and conservation, and industrial process improvements);
and
4. Heat and Power (clean and renewable energy supplies for
electricity and direct fuel use).
This sectoral snapshot shows that emission reduction
opportunities are available across all economic sectors, and
suggests that a comprehensive approach (i.e., all economic sectors,
policy instruments, and levels of government) is critical to
achieving full, cost-effective benefits for national goals. The
comparison of cost curves across economic sectors and actions
within each sector demonstrate that each is unique and must be
addressed by appropriate policy instruments. These differences
reflect choices made by stakeholders and technical work groups as
they developed policy agreements. Through the stepwise process,
stakeholders work to identify the most appropriate policy
implementation mechanisms that simultaneously reduce
emissions, reduce costs, address feasibility issues, and maximize
co-benefits. To do this they match the best policy instruments
(e.g., codes and standards, funding incentives, market based
approaches, negotiated agreements, information and education,
reporting and disclosure) with each of the underlying policy
actions (e.g., advancing energy efficiency, renewable energy,
transportation improvements, resource conservation, etc.) to create
optimal policy design.
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Figure 5. Stepwise Marginal Cost Function for U.S.
Economic Sectors, 2020
Mapping Implementation Across Jurisdictions and Policy Instruments
Stepwise Marginal Cost Curves of US by Sector, 2020(Center for Climate S rategles, 200)
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D. Analysis of Jurisdictional Responsibility.
State climate action plans have typically found that the
mechanisms needed to adopt a full range of policy solutions would
be difficult to undertake by a single level of governmental
jurisdiction (local, state, federal) alone.216 For example, energy
efficiencies that can be captured through improved building codes
may best be determined locally, whereas improved appliance
efficiency standards may best be determined at a regional or
national level due to market scale issues for manufacturers and
wholesalers. The result has been the development of policies that
call for integrated state and national solutions. From a technical
perspective, in order to attain the lowest cost approach to national
emissions reduction goals, a combination of policies and measures
216 See Peterson et al., Developing a Comprehensive Approach, supra note 19, at
230-31.
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at the state and federal levels is likely to be needed.
To determine whether this perception was correct, our analysis
of 900 policies from the twenty states grouped into eighty bundles
also examined the level of government having jurisdiction over
various climate policies. Our findings suggest that implementing
climate policies without significant state and local involvement
will preclude the involvement of some sectors critical to success
and exclude important tools. The federal government has some
role in fifty-two of the policy bundles or 65%, either through
funding, implementation, or both. However, the federal
government could be said to exercise exclusive jurisdiction in only
three of the policy areas, less than 4%. By contrast, state
governments have a role in implementing seventy of the bundles
(87.5%) and arguably exercise exclusive jurisdiction in eighteen of
the policy area bundles, or more than 20%. Local governments,
which are creatures of state governments, have a role in twenty-
two bundles and arguably exercise exclusive jurisdiction in one.217
In other words, a federal climate policy that engages the states
and involves them actively in a partnership is not only desirable,
but a necessary element of success, both in environmental and
economic terms.
E. The Emissions Savings and Cost Savings Achieved
Through State Planning Cannot Be Achieved Without
State Level Planning.
Most importantly, this analysis shows that these emissions
reductions and cost savings likely cannot be achieved without a
state-by-state planning mechanism that involves stakeholders from
all relevant sectors. First, they certainly cannot be achieved
through simple categorical standards under section 111 of the
Clean Air Act218 and the various mobile source authorities. Some
of the most cost-effective reductions are found in areas that cannot
be federally mandated or even regulated under the Clean Air Act-
areas such as land use, building codes, transportation controls,
agriculture, and forestry. Second, even where there is regulatory
authority, such as over fossil fuel-fired generating units, cost-
217 CTR. FOR CLIMATE STRATEGIS, POL'Y & PROGRAM OPPORTUNITIEs, supra note
15, at 5.
218 Clean Air Act § 11 (b), 42 U.S.C. § 741 l(b) (2006).
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effective reductions will require actions in areas not regulated that
will reduce demand. Add-on carbon capture and storage
technology is not yet feasible. Most reductions in the utility sector
will need to arise from energy efficiency and conservation
measures in homes, businesses, and industry; demand reduction
and management; and other measures that can be regulated by
states through SIPs but cannot be mandated by the federal
government. Other reductions will be achieved through changing
the technology of energy reduction to no carbon sources such as
nuclear, wind, hydro, solar, geothermal, biomass, and tidal power.
This switch will require state action through mechanisms such as
utility regulation and renewable portfolio standards. These
measures cannot be mandated under section 11 1.219
These reductions also cannot be achieved solely or most cost-
effectively through the cap-and-trade or GHG tax mechanism
without state planning that will facilitate such a market
mechanism. 20 The scale-up results presented above show that
there are a significant number of measures that have significant
cost savings per ton of GHG emissions reduced. More
importantly, the modeling and analysis from state planning
processes to date show that many emissions reduction measures
that are cost-effective today are not being implemented, such that
policies other than (or in addition to) market-based policies are
likely required. This is evident from the fact that many measures
have significant net negative costs per ton of carbon dioxide
reduced. This can be explained by the fact that there are many
market barriers and imperfections that require other, targeted
measures that can best be identified in a state-specific planning
process and have been identified in many state plans to date.222
These include the following:
Lack of knowledge. For example, many builders will not
incorporate energy saving into new construction, even where cost
effective, because buyers lack information about the relationship
between the additional capital costs, energy savings, and rate of
219 Clean Air Act § 111.
220 Doremus & Hanemann, supra note 25, at 811-16, 826-30.
221 See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
222 See Rose et al., supra note 91.
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Lack of connection between capital and operating
budgets/decisions. There are many systemic problems that
separate decisions on capital and operating costs, such that cost
effective investments may not be made. For example, net
commercial leases may make the owner responsible for capital
improvements and the lessee responsible for energy costs.
2 24
Lenders often do not look at operating costs from energy savings
in the determination of how much to lend for a mortgage on a new
or existing home. 225  Typically, governments and industry alike
will have different parts of the organizational structure making
operating and capital decisions.226
Legal authorization barriers. Sometimes states lack
authorization for mechanisms that can provide the financing for
the capital requirements to improve energy efficiency or
conservation. For example, local governments may face bond
caps that prevent them from raising capital that will have very
short payoff periods and require legislation to allow energy
increment financing. Only a few states have authorized energy
efficiency utilities.
227
Inability to pass through increased carbon emission costs.
Each state has a separate program of utility rate regulation that
often can impose limits on utilities' ability to pay costs or to obtain
a return on cost-effective energy efficiency and conservation
measures.2 28  These barriers, addressed by multiple measures in
state plans, could not be addressed under the existing federal law
and are unlikely to be addressed in any federal climate legislation.
223 William H. Golove & Joseph H. Eto, MARKET BARRIERS TO ENERGY EFFICIENCY:
A CRITICAL REAPPRAISAL OF THE RATIONALE FOR PUBLIC POLICIES TO PROMOTE ENERGY
EFFICIENCY 36-44 (1996), available at http://eetd.lbl.gov/ea/emp/reports/38059.pdf.
224 Id. at 9-10.
225 Id. at 10.
226 See id. at 30.
227 The first such utility is Efficiency Vermont, established in 2000 pursuant to 30
V.S.A. § 209 (1999). See also CVR § 30-000-051 (2009). Delaware has also
established a Sustainable Energy Utility (SEU), 29 Del. C. § 8059 (2008).
228 See NAT'L ACTION PLAN FOR ENERGY EFFICIENCY, UNDERSTANDING COST-
EFFECTIVENESS OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY PROGRAMS: BEST PRACTICES, TECHNICAL
METHODS, AND EMERGING ISSUES FOR POLICY-MAKERS 6-1 to 6-10 (2008), available at
http://www.epa.gov/cleanenergy/documents/cost-effectiveness.pdf.
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N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
Inability to aggregate capitalfor many small actions. Many of
the most cost-effective measures will need to be implemented by
homeowners and small businesses who may not have immediately
available capital. Mechanisms such as low and no interest loan
funds or energy efficiency utilities can be set up to aggregate
capital for many small projects that are unlikely to be implemented
without these measures.
Uneven distribution of costs and benefits. In many cases, costs
and benefits are not distributed equally, so that the party making
the critical decision may face perverse incentives. For example,
auto emissions standards produce significant net societal savings
but the manufacturers of automobiles have resisted building small
or energy saving vehicles because their profit margins are higher
on larger vehicles and they face retooling costs.
Lack of a market. Many cost-effective measures are not
implemented because there is no market. This is particularly true
of land use decisions and transportation decisions, which are
dictated by state and local decisions on land use regulation and
infrastructure investments.
These barriers present problems not just for federal cap-and-
trade but other federal legal tools, particularly in the area of
electricity generation. For example, establishing an emissions
standard for fossil fuel-fired electric generating units is unlikely to
encourage energy efficiency that will reduce demand for fossil
fuel-fired generation. Planning is a necessary element if the
necessary links and choices are to be made. State-level planning is
necessary because many of the links fall within areas traditionally
left largely or exclusively to state and local governments.
As is evident from CCS' analysis of state, federal, and local
jurisdiction over climate matters, while state planning is a
necessary element, it is not solely sufficient to achieve GHG
emissions reductions cost-effectively. Federal oversight and
coordination establishing floors and coordinating strategies and a
federal-state-local partnership are necessary. The SCIP approach
suggested here, including giving each state the discretion to
determine the scope of the cap-and-trade program, the methods
for allocation of emissions allowances and use of revenues, and
the mix of other measures, will allow each state to adopt the mix
of measures that will be most cost-effective and most legally
effective in light of that state's unique characteristics.
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This careful consideration of the appropriate mix of measures
can best be achieved through an individualized state-by-state
planning process for four key reasons:
1. Emissions reductions delivered through non-
market sector-based policies and measures at the
state and federal level reduce emissions and thereby
relieve pressure on a cap-and-trade program (or
other market based mechanisms) to deliver
economy-wide emissions reductions entirely on its
own.
2. Specific policies and measures, properly
designed, can reduce barriers to efficient GHG
emissions markets by using "non-price" policy
instruments where emission prices are not likely to
be fully effective at stimulating behavioral
response, and by otherwise addressing specific
market imperfections and failures (such as split
incentives). In so doing, they reduce the cost of
national cap-and-trade or GHG tax programs that
rely solely or primarily on efficiently priced
markets and mechanisms.
3. Sector-based policies and measures developed at
the state level also can assure the full level of effort
needed to reach economy-wide emissions reduction
targets if a federal cap-and-trade or GHG tax
program does not fully cover all economic sectors.
4. Sector-based policies and measures developed
by states through the climate planning process
described above provide a means to achieving co-
benefits (e.g. health, energy security) by selecting
policies using a broader set of criteria than "cost
per ton of GHG emissions reduced."
These issues highlight the importance of constructing a
comprehensive policy portfolio that appropriately matches
responsibility for policy implementation with the appropriate
jurisdiction level and policy instruments - recognizing that overlap
is inevitable and integration is important. The requirements for
planning to develop an appropriate policy design for GHG
emissions in each state with federal oversight and coordination
contained in section 110 of the Clean Air Act provide a medium to
2009
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accomplish this.
VI. Conclusion
Thus, there are important economic and environmental
advantages in preserving existing state and regional programs and
planning within the structure of the Clean Air Act. Under the
structure proposed here, the EPA would need to undertake a
number of specific duties that would create a federal construct and
federal floors. It would establish technology-based standards for
appropriate sectors (automobile, off road vehicles, some stationary
sources, best energy management practices for buildings pursuant
to new source review requirements). It would also be responsible
for establishing new standards for GHG state implementation
plans in an SIP call or other implementing regulations. The EPA
would determine and assign state-by-state emissions reduction
goals, establish the standards for a national cap-and-trade program
that states would adopt under section 11 0(a)(2)(A) of the Clean
Air Act,2 29 the standards for approving state climate plans, and
standards for the contents of an FIP. It would then be responsible
for reviewing and approving state plans and developing and
imposing an FIP for states that fail to act.
States would be responsible for doing what they do best,
developing and implementing the SCIPs. Based on the California
experience, it would likely be more effective for states to first
develop a conceptual plan very much like those developed to date.
After submitting conceptual plans to the EPA, the states could
then adopt or propose the specific implementation measures that
would become part of the SIP in a second phase. The state plans
would (1) select and describe a mix of market and non-market
mechanisms appropriate to meet emissions reduction goals (after
considering federal reductions) established by the EPA, and (2)
where cap-and-trade is selected as one of the measures, determine
what sectors would be covered, the point of regulation, and
allocation mechanisms. The EPA would not approve an SIP (or a
cap-and-trade element) unless the mix of measures selected in the
state plan achieved the necessary reductions.
This type of cap-and-trade would work similarly to the
229 Clean Air Act § I I0(a)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(A) (2006).
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successful EU trading program, where the individual nations are
given allocations that are met through a mix of market and non-
market mechanisms. Upon federal approval of the conceptual SIP
and the implementing measures, a state's cap-and-trade allocations
would become part of the federal system and could be traded
nationwide and used in each state according to the use approved in
the receiving state's SIP. Reductions outside of the allowance
system could not create offsets. If a state fails to submit a suitable
SIP, the EPA may designate an FIP, with allowances allocated to
emitters covered by the cap-and-trade portion of the FIP.
Given this structure, and based on the states' experience with
auctioning allowances, all existing incentives for responsible state
action would be retained and there would be incentives beyond
those for existing SIPs. A plan developed by state stakeholders
will be more likely to gain their acceptance and that of state law-
makers. More importantly, the state will be able to use revenues
from allowance auction revenues, while, if the federal government
promulgated an FIP under the current Clean Air Act authority (in
the absence of new implementing legislation), it would lack
authority to auction allowances, which would be awarded to
existing covered facilities free of charge, so that the state would
receive no revenues. These revenues and other measures can be
used to spur new industries with significant economic
development potential, as evidenced by the CCS studies. This
program would also maintain all existing enforcement
mechanisms and incentives under the Clean Air Act, which have
achieved significant improvements in air quality for other criteria
pollutants.
Thus, there are multiple advantages for preserving state
planning and implementation responsibility under this structure.
State and local planning will: (1) promote economic efficiency and
greater economic development potential; (2) produce greater
stakeholder acceptability; (3) be more likely to be effective
because it addresses sectors where the federal government cannot
or will not regulate and will approach the problem with a scalpel
rather than a meat ax; (4) preserve existing progress at state level;
and (5) rely on better state specific information and be less likely
to be influenced by lobbyists and trade associations that adopt the
least common denominator of their constituencies. Most
importantly, this structure will work better because, for the reasons
2009
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described below, the task of reducing GHG reductions cannot be
accomplished at the federal level alone.
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Appendix I - State GHG Emissions Reduction Goals
1990-
State, 20 Climate
Province, or GHG State Goals Plan
Region Coverage
Forecast
- 2000 levels by 2020; 50%
below by 2040
Arizona 144% 106%
- 15% below 2005 levels by
2020 (WCI)
* Recommended: 20%
below 2000 levels by 2020,
Arkansas 63% 35% below 2000 levels by 100%
2025, 50% below 2000
levels by 2035
- E.O.: 2000 level by 2010;
1990 by 2020; 80% below
1990 by 2050
California 40% - AB-32: 1990 levels by 100%
2020
- 15% below 2005 levels by
2020 (WCI)
Colorado 71% * 20% below 2005 level by 75%2020; 80% below by 2050
Two reduction scenarios
below 2005 levels: 1% by
2012, 11% by 2020, andIowa 43% TBD
50% by 2050; and 3% by
2012, 22% by 2020 and
90% by 2050.
* 1990 level by 2010; 10%
Connecticut 32% below by 2020; 75% below 100%
by 2050
2009
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- 2000 level by 2017; 1990 111% for
Florida 86% level by 2025; 80% below 2017; 134%
1990 by 2050 for 2025
Kansas 25% TBD TBD
- 1990 level by 2010; 10%
Massachusetts ? below by 2020; 75% below ?
by 2050
- 1990 level by 2010; 10%
Maine 34% below by 2020; 75% below 100%
by 2050
Interim Goals - Reduce
GHG from 2002 baseline
levels by 10-20% by 2015;
Michigan 26% 25-35% by 2025 TBD
Interim Goal - Reduce GHG
from 2002 baseline level by
80% by 2050.
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State, 1990-2020 Climate
Province, or GHG State Goals Plan
Region Forecast Coverage
Recommended: 10% below
2006 levels by 2012; 15% below
2006 levels by 2015; 25%
Maryland 42% (enforceable)-50% (science 100%
based) below 2006 levels by
2020; 90% below 2006 levels by
2050.
101% for
- Next Generation Energy Act: 2015;
Minnesota 48% 15% below 2005 levels by 2015; 98% for
30% by 2025; 80% by 2050 2025
* 1990 level by 2020; 80%
Montana 30% below by 2050 (consumption & 89%-105%
production)
North 88% TBD TBD
Carolina
* 1990 level by 2010; 10%
NEG/ECP below by 2020; 75% below by TBD
2050
N E.O. 54: 1990 level by 2020;
80% below 2006 levels by 2050
* 2000 level by 2012; 10%
below by 2020; 75% below by
New Mexico 65% 2050 133%
. 15% below 2005 levels by
2020 (WCI)
New York 24% • 5% below 1990 by 2010 ?
2009
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
Ontario ? 6% below 1990 by 2014 n/a
• 10% below 1990 by 2020; 75%
Oregon 61% below 1990 by 2050 85%
• 15% below 2005 levels by
2020 (WCI)
. 1990 level by 2010; 10%
Puget Sound 37% below by 2020; 75% below by 100%
2100
• 1990 level by 2010; 10%
Rhode Island 35% below by 2020; 75% below by 100%
2050
South 87% • 5% below 1990 levels by 2020 99%
Carolina (voluntary)
Utah 95% • 15% below 2005 levels by TBD
2020 (WCI)
• 25% below 1990 levels by
Vermont 26-59% 2012; 50% below 1990 by 2028; TBD
75% below by 2050
• E.O.: 1990 levels by 2020;
25% below 1990 by 2035; 50%
Washington 40% below 1990 by 2050 TBD
- 15% below 2005 levels by
2020 (WCI)
• 15% below 2005 levels by
WCI 54% 2020 (AZ, NM, CA, OR, UT, TBD
WA, BC, MB)
British 69% • 15% below 2005 levels by TBD
Columbia 2020 (WCI)
Manitoba TBD • 15% below 2005 levels by TBD
2020 (WCI)
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Appendix II - Development of State and National Marginal
Cost Curves for GHG Mitigation
This Appendix provides a detailed explanation of how the
marginal cost curves in Figures 1 and 5 were derived. Table 2
below provides the list of policy options that were part of the
analysis. Also provided in this Appendix is a summary of key
assumptions and uncertainties to permit independent corroboration
of the findings.
1. Developing State Marginal Cost (MC) Curves
To build a marginal cost curve of climate mitigation actions by
state and sector, a number of steps are required. First, the
following data are developed and summarized for each of the
quantified climate mitigation options in the climate action plans
for early and mid-term target years in each of the twenty states for
which it is currently available:
The GHG reduction potential of the mitigation option
(maximum percentage of total emissions that can be reduced by
the option)
The cost (or cost-saving) per ton of GHG that can be reduced
(specified in terms of cost-effectiveness)
For each state, the full list of climate mitigation policy actions
are then ordered from lowest cost to highest cost. A step function
is developed based on the mitigation potential and cost per ton of
GHG reduction for each policy option. This marginal cost curve of
GHG emissions reductions can be used for direct assessments of
cost-effectiveness of individual or cumulative actions, as done in
the state climate action plans. A stylized step function
characterizing a few major option categories is presented in Apx. I
- Figure 1 and a smooth fitted curve to the step function using
regression methods is also depicted in the figure. The fitted curve
can be used as the marginal cost curve for formally modeling
scenarios of state level policy instrument design, including a
variety of policies and measures, cap and trade, carbon tax, or
some combination.
2009
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Apx. I - Figure 1. Stylized Marginal Cost Curve for GHG
Mitigation
0 Car on Capture &00+
0 S questration
Coal-Gas Nuclear'
Mandated Sub ,
Conservation
____ 20 40 6 80
Energy
F:ffir.i.nr.v GHG Mitigation
Using Florida as an example, Apx. I - Table 1 summarizes 28
climate mitigation options analyzed in a quantitative manner for
the state by the Center for Climate Strategies through the technical
work group process. Column 3 of the table presents the estimated
2025 annual GHG reduction potential for each option, with
reduction potentials translated into percentages of the 2025 BAU
emissions level in Column 5. The estimated cost or cost savings
per ton of GHG removed by each option in 2025 is presented in
Column 4. The options are listed in ascending order in terms of
cost, beginning with the cheapest option. Column 6 lists the
cumulative GHG reduction potentials of the policy options listed
in the table. The last column presents the proportion of GHG
mitigation contributed by each option.
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Apx. I - Table 1. GHG Mitigation Options for Florida in
2025230
Estimated Estimated GHG
2025 Cost or Reduction Cumulative
Climate Mitigation Annual Cost Potential as GHG Weights
Sector Actions GHG Savings Percentage Reduction (add-up
Reduction per ton of 2025 Potential to 100)
Potential GHG Baseline
(MMtCO2e) Removed Emissions
Develop and
TLU Expand Low-GHG 12.62 -$142 2.72% 2.72% 5.83
Fuels
Low Rolling
TLU ResistanceTires 1.84 -$90 0.40% 3.12% 0.85
and Other Add-On
Technologies
Improving
Transportation
TLU System 6.98 -$80 1.51% 4.63% 3.22
Management
(TSM)
Improved
Commercialization
of Biomass-to-
Energy
AFW Conversion and 0.3 -$62 0.06% 4.69% 0.14
Bio-Products
Technologies-C.
Bio-Products
Technologies and
Use
230 AFW=agriculture, forestry and waste management; ESD=energy supply and
demand; TLU-transportation and land use. The Florida 2025 projected
consumption-based gross GHG emission level is 463.3 million metric tons of
carbon dioxide equivalent (MMtCO2e).
2009
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Demand-Side
Management
(DSM)/Energy
ESD Efficiency 21.8 -$43 4.71% 9.40% 10.06
Programs, Funds,
or Goals for
Electricity
Building Codes for
Energy Efficiency
ESD (HB 697 and 15.4 -$30 3.32% 12.72% 7.11
Executive Order
127)
Promoting
Renewable
Electricity through
Renewable
ESD Portfolio Standard 34.5 -$29 7.45% 20.17% 15.93
(RPS), incentives
and barrier
removal (20% by
2020)
Energy Efficiency
ESD in Existing 5.4 -$28 1.17% 21.34% 2.49
Residential
Buildings
Improved Building
ESD Codes for Energy 4.9 -$27 1.06% 22.39% 2.26
Efficiency
Improved
Commercialization
of Biomass-to-
Energy
Conversion and
AFW Bio-Products 0.09 -$17 0.02% 22.41% 0.04
Technologies-A.
Manure
Digestion/Other
Waste Energy
Utilization
Power Plant
ESD Efficiency 8.9 -$14 1.92% 24.33% 4.11
Improvements
Promotion of
Farming Practices
That Achieve
AFW GhG Bee 0.9 -$9 0.19% 24.53% 0.42H  enefits-
A. Soil Carbon
Management
In-State
AFW Liquid/Gaseous 8.2 -$8 1.77% 26.30% 3.79Biofuels
Production
ESD Landfill Gas-To- 8.7 $1 1.88% 28.18% 4.02
Energy (LFGTE)
Increasing Freight
TLU Movement 1.1 $2 0.24% 28.41% 0.51
Efficiencies
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0.67% 29.08% 1.43
Combined Heat
ESD and Power (CHP) 2.2 $5 0.47% 29.56% 1.02
Systems
AFW Reforestation 11.6 $5 2.50% 32.06% 5.35
Promotion of
Advanced
Municipal Solid
Waste (MSW)
AFW Management 4.4 $9 0.95% 33.01% 2.03
Technologies
(Including
Bioreactor
Technology)
AFW B. Urban Forestry 8.7 $10 1.88% 34.89% 4.02
AFW APine Plantation 0.9 $11 0.19% 35.08% 0.42Management
B.Non-Federal
AFW Public Land 0.4 $11 0.09% 35.17% 0.18
Management
Expanded Use of
Agriculture,
Forestry, and
Waste
AFW Management 40 $21 8.63% 43.80% 18.46
(AFW) Biomass
Feedstocks for
Electricity, Heat,
and Steam
Production
Forest
Retention-
Reduced
AFW Conversion of 0.6 $26 0.13% 43.93% 0.28
Forested to Non-
Forested Land
Uses
Promotion of
Farming Practices
That Achieve
AFW Tha Bee 0.3 $26 0.06% 44.00% 0.14GHG en fits-C .
Nutrient
Management
ESD Nuclear Power 7.3 $36 1.58% 45.57% 3.37
Improved
Commercialization
of Biomass-to-
AFW Energy 5 $44 1.08% 46.65% 2.31
Conversion and
Bio-Products
I Technologies- B.
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
WWTP Biosolids
Energy Production
& Other Biomass
Conversion
Technologies
Reduce the Rate of
Conversion of
AFW Agricultural Land 0.5 $93 0.11% 46.76% 0.23
and Open Green
Space to
I Development
Based on the data presented in Apx. I - Table 1, the stepwise
marginal cost function for Florida in 2025 is drawn in Apx. I -
Figure 2. The horizontal axis represents the percentage of GHG
emissions reduction, and the vertical axis represents the marginal
cost or savings of mitigation. In the figure, each horizontal
segment represents an individual mitigation option. The width of
the segment indicates the GHG emission reduction potential of the
option in percentage terms. The height of the segment relative to
the x-axis shows the average cost (saving) of reducing one ton of
GHG with the application of the option.
In this example, the step function is color-coded for three
different sectors (ESD: Energy Supply and Demand; TLU:
Transportation and Land Use; AFW: Agriculture, Forestry, and
Waste Management). The figure indicates that, collectively, the
reduction potential of the 28 options from all these sectors can
avoid about 47% of 2025 baseline emissions in Florida. The ESD
sector has the highest reduction potential. On average, options in
the AFW sector have the highest costs per ton, while most options
in the TLU and ESD sectors would result in cost savings.
One possible specification of a marginal cost (MC) curve for
Florida is the following functional form:
MC =a+bxln(l-R)
where, MC is the marginal cost; R is the percentage reduction of
GHG emissions; a and b are intercept and slope parameter values,
respectively.
This logarithmic functional form is consistent with theoretical
expectations and empirical findings on diminishing returns of
emission control.2 31 As the emission reductions increase along the
231 WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, MANAGING THE GLOBAL COMMONS (MIT Press 1994).
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X-axis, the cost to reduce one additional unit of emission increases
at an accelerating rate; in other words, it exhibits diminishing
returns.
Apx. I-Figure 2. Stepwise Marginal Cost Function for Florida,
2025232
Economy-wide Stepwise
Marginal Cost Curve of Florida, 2025
(Center for Climate Strategies, 2008)
$100 
$75 _ AllSector -TLU -ESD -AFW
$50
$25
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-$100
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Percentage Reduction of 2025 BAU GHG Emissions
When we fit the curve, we weight each policy option based
on its GHG mitigation potential. This gives relatively greater
influence to those options that have the potential for higher levels
of application, and thereby should improve the accuracy of the
estimation.
The logarithmic marginal cost curve for Florida (the pink
curve) depicted in Apx. I - Figure 3 has the following
specification:
MC = -78.43 -195.14 x ln(l - R)
The curve has a Y-axis intercept at MC = -$78.43. The
curve increases to MC=O at the emission reduction level of 33%,
which indicates that Florida has cost-saving mitigation options
(such as energy efficiency) up to that level of the 2025 BAU
232 AFW=agriculture, forestry and waste management, ESD=energy supply
and demand, TLU--transportation and land use.
2009
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emissions. The regression analysis that estimates the fitted curve
has an R-square of 0.7649, indicating a reasonably good fit.
An alternative specification of the step-function is to use a
third-order polynomial functional form. This alternative fitted
curve is also depicted in Apx. I - Figure 3 (the green curve). It
indicates the usual diminishing returns at the tail end of the
mitigation process, but also better captures the influence of the
broad range of energy efficiency and other cost saving options.
The third-order polynomial cost curve for Florida has the
following specification:
MC = 0.00796 x (R - 27) 3
This fitted curve has a Y-axis intercept at MC = -$156.72.
The curve increases to MC=0 at the emission reduction level of
27%. The regression analysis that estimates this fitted curve also
has a good fit, with an R-square of 0.8639.
Either fitted MC curve then can be used in our non-linear
programming model of policy instrument design, which has been
applied to the analysis of cap and trade, carbon tax, and/or
regulatory (command and control) responses to the Kyoto
Protocol, European Union Trading System, Regional Greenhouse
Gas Initiative (RGGI), Midwestern Governors Association (MGA)
region, Western Climate Initiative (WCI), Pacific Rim states and
countries, and Florida's choice of joining RGGI or WCI.233
233 See Rose et al., International Equity and Differentiation in Global Warming
Policy, 12 ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 25 (1998); Adam Rose & ZhongXiang Zhang,
Interregional Burden-Sharing of Greenhouse Gas Mitigation in the United States, 9
MITIGATION & ADAPTATION STRATEGIES FOR GLOBAL CHANGE 477 (2004); MINNESOTA
CLIMATE CHANGE ADVISORY GROUP, MINNESOTA CLIMATE CHANGE ADVISORY GROUP
FINAL REPORT, A REPORT TO THE MINNESOTA LEGISLATURE, available at
http://www.mnclimatechange.us/MCCAG.cfn (2008); Adam Rose & Dan Wei,
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading Among Pacific Rim Countries: An Analysis of
Policies to Bring Developing Countries to the Bargaining Table, 36 ENERGY POL'Y 1420
(2008); FLORIDA GOVERNOR'S ACTION TEAM ON ENERGY AND CLIMATE CHANGE,
FLORIDA'S ENERGY AND CLIMATE CHANGE ACTION PLAN (2008), available at
http://www.flclimatechange.us./stakeholder.cfino.
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Apx. I - Figure 3. Stepwise and Fitted Marginal Cost Curves
for Florida, 2025234
Economy-wide Stepwise and Fitted
Marginal Cost Curves of Florida, 2025
(Center for Climate Strategies, 2008)
$100
$75 - IFitted Curve with a Third-order [
$50 Polynomial Functional Form
$25
$0
-$120
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Percentage Reduction of 2025 BAU GHG Emissions
2009
234 BAU=business as usual (no new actions to address climate) S/tCO2e= cost per ton
carbon dioxide equivalent.
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
2. Developing National Marginal Cost (MC) Curves
We developed the GHG mitigation marginal cost curve for
the United States based on the mitigation and cost data of the
twenty states with quantification analysis available. The GHG
mitigation (sequestration) options for the twenty states are put
together and then classified into the four sectors (ES, RCI, TLU,
235and AFW). Next, the national MC step function is developed
using the same methodology as described in Section 1. Apx. I -
Figure 4 shows the stepwise marginal cost curve of the United
States for the year 2020. Each horizontal segment in Apx. I -
Figure 4 represents an individual policy option from a state.
Although many similar policy options (such as Renewable
Portfolio Standard and Clean Car Standard) are recommended in
more than one state Action Plans, since different states would have
different implementation costs associated with these policies, we
did not combine the same policy options implemented in different
states. The reduction potential of each policy option (as shown
along the horizontal axis in Apx. I - Figure 4) is computed with
respect to the total emissions of the twenty states in the year 2020.
Since the national curve is developed from the data collected from
the twenty states, it can be viewed as the weighted average curve
of these states.
3. Summary of Key Assumptions:
*The state curves for AZ, CA, CO, CT, IA, MD, ME, MT, NC,
NM, NY, RI, SC, UT, and WA are for year 2020. The curves
for AR, FL, MI, and MN are for 2025, and the curve for VT is
for 2028.
*UT only has data for energy efficiency options in RCI and TLU
sectors. Thus, the cost curve for UT is partial.
235 The mitigation options for Arkansas, Florida, Michigan, and Minnesota are
analyzed for Year 2025, and the options for Vermont are for Year 2028. The data for the
remaining states is for Year 2020. For the national curves, we used Year 2020 as the
standard year. In order to approximate 2020 MC curves for the states that have
performed quantification analysis for target years other than 2020, we assumed a 2%
technical improvement or innovation rate for these states. Our method is to shift the step
function of AR, FL, MI, and MN 2% a year upward from 2025 back to 2020, and shift
the step function of VT 2% a year upward from 2028 back to 2020.
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*The standard year we used for national curves is 2020. The
mitigation cost data for options of AR, FL, MI, MN, and VT
are adjusted to year 2020 based on the assumption of 2%
annual technical improvement or innovation rate. In other
words, we used the same reduction potential numbers for
individual options in year 2020 as in year 2025 (2028), and
assumed the cost per ton of CO2e reduction being about
(1+2%)' (n=5 for AR, FL, MI, and MN, and n=8 for VT)
higher in year 2020 than in year 2025 (2028).
*Some policy options are analyzed for different sensitivity cases
or the per unit mitigation costs are presented in cost ranges. In
such cases, we used average numbers in the cost curve
development.
oWhen we developed the fitted MC curves from the step MC step
functions, each policy option is weighted based on its GHG
mitigation potential. This gives relatively greater influence to
those options that have the potential for higher levels of
application and should improve the accuracy of the estimation.
oThe marginal cost curves embody direct mitigation costs only
and do not include various transactions costs.
eThe marginal cost curves do not distinguish between producer vs.
consumer allocation of permits.
4. Summary of Key Uncertainties:
* In state Climate Change Action Plans, some policy options are
only analyzed in a qualitative way, i.e., no quantified GHG
reductions or mitigation costs/cost savings or both have been
evaluated. When we develop the state and national cost
curves, we only utilized the list of options that have both the
reduction and cost data available. Potentially, this would
result in an underestimation of the total mitigation potential of
all applicable GHG mitigation options.
" National economy-wide and sectoral marginal mitigation cost
curves are developed based on the options of the twenty states
that have reduction and cost data. This method approximates
the national curves as the weighted average of the twenty state
curves. We consider these twenty states a good representation
of the United States in terms of the proportions of GHG
emissions contributed by different sectors and the coverage of
2009
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regions.236  The accuracy of the national curve can be
improved as more state data become available.
9 For most states, the step function orders individual options
(that have quantified cost/savings) from lowest cost to highest,
without taking account of overlaps among options. Some
states have evaluations of aggregated overlaps at the sectoral
level. Only a few states provide overlaps analysis at the option
level. We are only able to eliminate the overlaps among
options for AR, CA, IA, and MI in the cost curves. Absence of
adjustment of overlaps in other states results in an
overestimation of their mitigation potential.
236 The proportions of the 2020 projected emissions from the ES, RCI, AFW, and
TLU sectors of the 20 states are 34.3%, 24.4%, 8.4%, and 32.9%, respectively. Based on
the U.S. 2006 emissions inventory, the corresponding proportions are 38.7%, 25.1%,
9.5%, and 26.8%. Therefore, if we assume the emission proportions are the same in 2020
for the U.S. as in 2006, the 20 states only slightly under-represent the emissions from the
energy supply sector, and slightly over-represent the emissions from the transportation
and land use sector.
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